reasons being given for such extensions. In total, nearly four years elapsed since the first indictment without any clarification of some of the initial charges. 71. The Commission notes that in the particular circumstances where a person’s guilt has not yet been proven, freedom should remain the rule and detention the exception. This rule is also enshrined in Section 221(1) of Cameroon’s Criminal Procedure Code which provides for a maximum detention period of eighteen (18) months and the release of the accused unless he is detained for other reasons. The merit of such a requirement is that it guarantees the effectiveness of justice by speeding up its procedures. Thus, any delay suffered by a procedural act that exceeds the limits prescribed by law - the national legislation in this case - cannot be reasonable. 72. The Commission takes note of the willingness of the Respondent State to resolve problems related to the length of local remedy procedures as evidenced by the establishment of a Special Criminal Tribunal whose prescriptions relating to trial timeframes are definitely an improvement. However, the Commission finds that the reform only goes to confirm the issue of non-compliance with the legal and reasonable timeframes by the national courts. The proof is that the establishment of the Special Criminal Tribunal was not able to prevent the prolonging of the trial period. The establishment of the Tribunal was subsequent to the occurrence of all the delays observed above. The same observations apply to the proceedings pending before the Supreme Court. 73. In summary, regarding the issue of local remedies being prolonged, the Commission finds that the proceedings initiated against the Complainant by the judicial authorities of the Respondent State were marked by a multiplicity of procedural acts, lack of response or delayed response to local remedies sought and non-compliance with the legal timeframes. This situation caused delays in the 19