State, for this reason the Communication is inadmissible ratione temporae. 58. The Respondent State further argues that even if the applicants argue that the relevant date for determining the violation of rights is 5 June 1995, on which date the President of the Republic of South Africa enacted Proclamation 56 of 1995, this argument would still not be helpful because first, the enactment merely served to re-enact the formula in Government Notice 3 of 1994. Secondly, this date still falls before the entry into force of the Charter for the Republic of South Africa. 59. The Respondent State submits that there is no case of continuing violation in this matter because the events complained of took place in 1994/ 1995 and the Complainant has not made any further allegations of subsequent events which themselves constitute violations of their rights under the Charter. The Proclamation complained of applies only to those pension payouts that took place in 1993 on account of the privatisation scheme. There is no possibility of applying the Proclamation complained of in any payout occurring in the future or, in any event, subsequent to the entry into force of the Charter. All the events necessary for the determination of the rights of everyone affected were completed prior to the entry into force of the Charter and there can, therefore be no case of continuing effects. 60. The second reason proffered by the Respondent State for the Communication to be declared inadmissible regarding compatibility, is that the Communication does not set out prima facie violation of a right in the African Charter. The State supports this argument with the Commission's decisions in Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l'Homme/ Cameroun and Frederick Korvah/Liberia. 5 It further cites the Commission's decision in Griebenow (on behalf of David Ashley Price)/ South Africa6 , where the Commission, while finding the Communication admissible, accepted the Respondent State's assertion that a prima facie case of violation of a right in the Charter has to be shown in order for a matter to be deemed admissible. 61. The Respondent State also refers to Article 60 of the Charter which invites the Commission to draw inspiration from decisions of other international human rights bodies. It argues that the Commission should consider the decisions of the Human Rights Committee, where in interpreting the provisions of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has held inadmissible Communications which did not "substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, that the conduct" complained of amounted to a violation of rights in the ICCPR7 ; Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has declared inadmissible Communications lacking in merit and that are insufficiently substantiated.8 62. The Respondent State submits on the basis of the above that to be admissible, a Communication must provide a prima facie evidence of violation of a right in the Charter. It states that for there to be prima facie violation of the Charter the Communication must concern a violation of the African Charter and not of domestic law and must be substantiated. The Respondent State is of the view that the Complainant's Communication has failed to meet these tests. 63. On the first test on substantiation, the Respondent State argues that the Complainant only alleges that various rights of theirs have been violated under Articles 2, 3, 13 and 15, of the Charter, but there is no attempt to substantiate those allegations. 64. The Respondent State also argues that local remedies have not been exhausted, since the Complainant has never raised these alleged violations in the domestic courts. It stated that the only alleged violation which the Complainant has made an attempt to substantiate is the allegation of the violation of their right not to be discriminated against. 65. The Respondent State points out that the Complainant has not shown that the Vhenda People have been discriminated against in relation to the rights provided for in the Charter. It also points out that regarding equality before the law which the Complainant allege, the scheme was not forced on the Vhenda Government employees, rather they elected to have their pension funds privatized. 66. The Respondent State argues further that the decision of the Vhenda People to privatize was based on financial reasons and in particular the decision was based on the understanding that the South Africa scheme was under-resourced and that come reintegration into the Democratic South Africa, they would be better off. The ground for differentiation was therefore, a financial decision made by the Complainant and not based on race, sex, religion or any other ground prohibited in the Charter. 67. The Respondent State also submits that the Communication is about the calculation of benefits, that the calculation enacted by the Government Notice 3 of 1994 and the Presidential Proclamation of 1995, was incorrect. It also submits that the African Commission cannot be expected to adjudicate on such matters and to do so would be to extend the mandate of the Commission beyond the determination of human rights violations in the African Charter to another area of law. Exercising jurisdiction in such matters would imply legislative competencies in domestic policies unforeseen by the drafters of the African Charter 6