dignity of the affected persons or infringe on their enjoyments of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. 118. The Respondent State has justified the rational for the enactment of Proclamation 1 of 1994, amending and giving retrospective effect to Proclamation 9 of 1993 which it asserts, was to avoid any discrimination between beneficiaries of the first and the second privatisation schemes. It has also explained that the privatization of the Venda Pension Funds was a result of the relentless march of history and the Government took all reasonable measures to mitigate the effects of the events on Venda civil servants. The Complainants have not disputed any of these facts. This is sufficient proof that the Government took reasonable steps to remedy the situation that could have potentially led to unfair discrimination. The Commission considers as a consequence that the enactment of Proclamation 1 of 1994 cannot therefore be considered arbitrary, but was meant to achieve a legitimate purpose. 119. The Commission also notes that the Respondent State did not obligate the members of the Venda Pension Fund to privatise their earning. They made a free financial choice and their contention that the formula used in calculating their benefits is a matter that does not fall within the purview of the Commission's mandate. In this regard, the Commission agrees with the Respondent State's contention that the ground for differentiation was based on a financial decision made by the Complainants and not race, not sex, not religion or any other ground prohibited by Article 2 of the Charter, but the result of the subsequent calculation of pension benefits by an independent contractor. It has been clearly established that the Respondent State took prompt measures to recover payments made to beneficiaries of the first privatization scheme which were over and above their entitlements in order to place them at a par with beneficiaries of the second privatization scheme. 120. The Complainants have failed to prove that the conduct of the Respondent State in differentiating between categories of civil servants lacked a rational purpose nor that such differentiation led to a fundamental impairment of their dignity as human beings or that the distinction affected their enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the African Charter. The Commission therefore finds that the conduct of the Respondent State did not violate the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter. Alleged Violation of Article 3 121. Article 3 of the African Charter protects the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law. 122. The Complainants have referred the Commission to the facts of the case as substantiation of the violation of this provision of the Charter. The Respondent State on the other hand contends that the facts of the case raise no issues under Article 3. 123. In Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Esmaila Connateh and 13 others v Angola,25 the Commission referred to the United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v Board of Education of Topekal (sic!)26 wherein the right to equal protection of the law was defined as the right of all persons to have the same access to the law Courts and to be treated equally by the law courts, both in the procedure and in the substance of the law. 124. The treatment of the Complainants by the courts of law in South Africa is not at issue in the present Communication. From the facts of the present Communication, the Complainants were given unrestricted access to the Courts/tribunals of the Respondent State which dismissed the case for various reasons. The Complainants have not shown that the courts failed to give them the same treatment accorded to others. 125. The Commission therefore finds that the Complainants 'allegation of a violation of Article 3 by the Respondent has not been established and can therefore not be sustained. Alleged violation of Article 13 126. Article 13 of the Charter provides as follows: 1. "Every Citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with provisions of the (sic!) 2. Every citizen shall have the right to equal access to public service of the country 3. Every individual shall have the right to access public property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law'". 13