objectively justified. See also PANYIK V. HUNGARY, (2011) APP NO 12748/06 ECHR Strasbourg. Again in MORICE v. FRANCE (2015) APP NO. 29369/10, ECHR, it was stated that an Applicant who had argued nevertheless that the very presence of a judge on the bench presiding over his case had created a situation which justified his fears of lack of impartiality, the court thus examined the case from the perspective of the objective impartiality test, addressing the question whether the Applicant’s doubts could be regarded as objectively justified in the circumstances. The Court held in the affirmative that due to the previous judicial proceedings between the judge and the Applicant, the Applicant’s fears were objectively justified. Thus any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw. The Court is convinced that the grounds disclosed by the Plaintiff were sufficient to ground his fears of bias and impartiality and the judge ought to have withdrawn from the case. The mere stating that the Plaintiff has not disclosed reasonable grounds does not portray objectivity on the part of the Judge. The Court is of the considered view that the powers exercised by the trial judge were done arbitrarily eschewing improper influences. The Court therefore finds that there were no sufficient guarantees provided to exclude legitimate doubt as to the trial Judge’s impartiality towards the Plaintiff. Consequently, it is the finding of the Court that the act of the Defendant in maintaining the said judge to try the Applicant’s case, violates the provisions of Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF IN ITS ENTIRETY FOLLOWED DUE PROCESS IN LAW. 26