and the mere mention of the term « peoples » in the provisions of Article 22 of the Charter cannot adequately interpret the right to development as being solely and exclusively collective. In spite of its community emphasis, particularly with regard to the right to development, the Charter clearly recognizes the crucial role of the individual without whose self-fulfillment the development of the peoples may be compromised. In certain circumstances, the development of the peoples and the individual may be concomitant. From the perspective of the contents of the right to development under the Charter, the States Parties have a mediate obligation to meet the requirements for the enjoyment of this right and an immediate obligation to at least create the opportunities and environment conducive to the enjoyment of the said right. In other words, there is the need to ensure a gradual implementation, but it is immediately recommended that the individual and collective right to development should be respected, protected and promoted. 184. The Inter-American Human Rights Court carefully formulates this meaning of the right to development by conceptualizing development in the form of a « life plan ». The Court held then in Loyza Tamayo v. Peru, that The concept of the ‘plan of life’ is comparable to that of self-fulfilment, which is in turn based on the options available to an individual to lead his life and to achieve the objectives he has set for himself. (…) It may be difficult to consider an individual as being free if he has no option to continue to lead his life and to do so to its natural conclusion. (…) Consequently, the elimination or hindrance of these options constitutes a violation or loss of a priceless asset which this Court cannot ignore.64 185. In the case in point, the Commission notes that as a result of the denial of nationality, the Dioulas as well as the other victims were unable to obtain the legal recognition necessary for, as is the case of all modern organized societies, the enjoyment of a set of advantages. This lack of recognition of nationality as legal status also prevented them from participating in the shaping and enjoyment of the socio-economic development witnessed by Côte d’Ivoire since independence. With regard to the Dioulas in particular, the impossibility to be recognized as Ivorians prevented them from accessing public jobs, participating in public and political life by voting in elections and getting voted for. This, in turn, hinders every possibility for them to decide with other Ivorians choices relating to the destiny of the Ivorian nation as well as to enjoy the fruits of its social, political, economic and cultural advances. 64 Loyza Tamayo v. Peru Inter-American Human Rights Court, Order of 19 November 1999, para 191. 60