Without producing any document title, the State added that it is apparent from the documents available that he was maintaining dialogue with a government which he claims was persecuting him. The State observed further that the letter of resignation even showed the address Complainant was residing and “assuming the government of Zimbabwe really wanted his life, it would have used the address he had volunteered to track him”. The State concluded by stating that the truth is that [the] “Complainant was never threatened by anyone, anywhere both within and outside Zimbabwe”. 51. On the admissibility of the communication, the State argued that the communication be declared inadmissible for non-compliance with the provisions of Articles 56(2), (5) and (6) of the Charter. 52. The State argued that the communication is not compatible as required by Article 56.2 of the Charter, as it makes general allegations without substantiating, adding that, for a complaint to be compatible with the Charter or the Constitutive Act, it must prove a prima facie violation of the Charter. According to the State, the facts raised in the communication do not raise any violation of the Charter, noting that “basically the facts and issues in dispute do not fall within the rationae personae of the jurisdiction of the Commission”. 53. On the exhaustion of local remedies under Article 56.5, the State submitted that local remedies were available to the Complainant, citing section 24 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which provides the course of action to be taken where there is human rights violation. The State added that there is no evidence to prove that the Complainant pursued local remedies. The State further indicated that in terms of Zimbabwe law, where one is engaged in acts that violate the rights of another person, that other person can obtain an interdict from the court restraining the violator from such act. 54. On the effectiveness of the remedies, the State submitted that the Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary in the exercise of its mandate in conformity with both the UN Principles on an Independent Judiciary and the African Commission’s Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial. 55. The State dismissed the Complainant’s argument that his case is similar to those brought by Sir Dawda Jawara / The Gambia and Rights International (on behalf of Charles Baridorn Wiwa) / Nigeria, adding that in the latter cases, there was proof of real threat to life, the State went further to indicate instances where the government has implemented court decisions that went against it. 56. The State further indicated that in terms of Zimbabwe law, it is not a legal requirement for a Complainant to be physically present in the country in order to access local remedies, adding that both the High Court Act and the Supreme Court Act permit any person to make an application to either court through his/her lawyer. The State added that in the Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka case, the victims were tortured by State agents and they applied for compensation while they were both in the United Kingdom and succeeded in their claim. The State concluded that the Complainant is not barred from pursuing remedies in a similar manner. 57. The State further submitted that since his resignation, the government of Zimbabwe continues to pay the Complainant his pension benefits and argued that the excuse raised by the Complainant of lack of resources to enable him submit his complaint on time is therefore without merit adding that he could have instructed his counsel in Zimbabwe to attend to his claim on his behalf. 58. According to the State, the Complainant sought to mislead the Commission by claiming that under the State Liabilities Act, claims against the State are prescribed within a period of sixty days. The State indicated that section 6 of the Act is clear that the sixty days is in respect of a notice of intention to sue. The Act prescribes that a summons against [the] State in certain matters must be delivered sixty days after the notice of intention to sue, and according to the State, this would actually work well for the Complainant, adding that the period of proscription of claims is three years and Complainant’s claim was not yet three years and thus not prescribed. 59. The State also submitted that the complaint does not conform to Article 56.6 of the Charter indicating that the communication should be lodged within a reasonable time after exhaustion of local remedies, but where Complainant realises that local remedies shall be unduly prolonged, he/she must submit the complaint to the Commission immediately. According to the State, although the Charter does not specify what constitute a reasonable time, the Commission should get inspiration from the other jurisdictions, including the Inter-American Commission which has fixed six months as reasonable time, adding that even the draft protocol merging the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides for six months.