106. Article 10 of the European Convention, 13 of the American Convention and Article 9 of the African Charter all emphasise that the exercise and enjoyment of freedom of expression can be restricted under lawful conditions. 107. The African Commission has adopted a Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa which upholds certain basic principles aimed at enhancing the enjoyment of freedom of expression. Principle II of the Declaration states that; "(1) No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his or her freedom of expression; and (2). Any restrictions on freedom of expression shall be provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary in a democratic society”(emphasis added). The African Commission reads from the foregoing that the right to freedom of expression may be restricted by legislation which aims to protect the public or individuals, against practice of journalism which deviates from certain basic norms and legitimate interests in a democratic society. The restrictions imposed by AIPPA do not fall within those norms or interests. 108. The individual’s right to freedom of expression thus carries with it the right to impart information to others. The right to freedom of expression within the context of the African Charter must also be read together with the duties of the individual under Article 27. Hence when an individual’s freedom of expression is unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that is being violated, but also the right of all others to “receive” information and ideas. When the Charter proclaims that every individual has the right to receive information and disseminate opinions, it also implicitly emphasises the fact that the expression, reception and dissemination of ideas and information are indivisible concepts. This means that restrictions that are imposed on dissemination represent, in equal measure, a direct limitation on the right to express oneself freely. The Commission is thus of the opinion that the two dimensions of the right to freedom of expression must be guaranteed simultaneously. 109. In the present communication, the Respondent State cites the protection of public order, security and public safety as reasons to ensure the regulation of the profession of journalism. It argues further that the practice of journalism does not place it beyond statutory regulation and any such law has however to conform to the stringent requirements of limitations provided for by the Constitution. The Commission finds that the notion of public order in a State implies conditions that ensure the normal and harmonious functioning of institutions on the basis of an agreed system of values and principles. The Commission notes however that maintenance of public order in the exercise of the freedom of expression is perfectly conceivable without the necessity of restricting the practice of journalists. 110. Further, the same concept of public order in a democratic society demands the greatest possible amount of information. It is the widest possible circulation of news, ideas and opinions as well as the widest access to information by society as a whole that ensures this public order. 111. In the instant communication, the restrictions imposed on the practice of individual journalists can thus not be justified on the grounds of public order. 112. With regards to the Respondent’s assertion that the restrictions imposed by the AIPPA are within the domestic law of Zimbabwe, in conformity with Section 20 (2) of the Constitution of the Respondent State, the Commission notes that, the meaning of the phrase “within the law” in Article 9.2 must be interpreted in the context of Principle II as elaborated under theDeclaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression stated hereinabove. In other words, the meaning of the phrase “within the law,” must be considered in terms of whether the restrictions meet the legitimate interests, and are necessary in a democratic society. In addition, the concept of “within the law” employed in the Charter cannot be divorced from the general concept of the protection of human rights and freedoms. 14 113. In Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia , the African Commission elaborated the meaning of such phrases such as; ‘in accordance with the law’, or ‘previously laid down by law’ or ‘within the law’. In [those] communications, the Republic of The Gambia defended arbitrary arrests and detention and stated that it was acting within the confines of legislation ‘previously laid down by law’, as required by the wordings of Article 6 of the Charter. 114. The Commission rejected the arguments by The Gambia and restated its decision in Alhassane 15 Aboubacar v Ghana , that