75. Of particular importance here is to note that in spite all the threats, harassment, intimidations, threatening phone calls and alleged tracking by Respondent States' agents, [the] Complainant chooses not to report the matter to the police. From his submissions, he was harassed and intimidated for over six months, that is, from August 2004 when he claims he was first arrested, to January 2005, when he left the country. In his submissions, he did not indicate why he could not submit the matter to the police for investigation but preferred reporting to his employers and his lawyers. In the opinion of the Commission, the Complainant has not substantiated his allegations with facts. Even if, for example, the detention of the Complainant amounted to psychological torture, it could not have been life-threatening to cause the Complainant flee for his life. Apart from the alleged inhumane conditions under which he was held, there is no indication of physical abuse like in the Shumba and Wiwa cases. Torture could not have been the cause for the Complainant's fleeing the country because the alleged inhumane and degrading or torturous treatment occurred in August/September 2004, and the Complainant remained in the country until January 2005, and even made court appearances on at least four occasions to answer charges brought against him. The alleged intimidation and threat to the Complainant's life occurred between August and October 2004. This means that by the time the Complainant left for South Africa in January 2005, the alleged threats and intimidation had ceased. There is therefore no evidence to prove that his leaving the Respondent State was as a result of fear for his life occasioned by threats and intimidation, or that even if he was threatened and intimidated, this could be attributed to the Respondent State. 76. The Complainant has simply made general allegations and has not corroborated his allegations with documentary evidence or testimonies of others. He has not shown, like in the other cases mentioned above, the danger he found himself in that necessitated his fleeing the country. Without concrete evidence to support the allegations made by the Complainant, the Commission cannot hold the Respondent State responsible for whatever harassment, intimidation and threats that the Complainant alleges he suffered, that made him flee the country for his life. This is even so because [the] Complainant never bothered to report these incidences to the police or raise them with the magistrate when he appeared four times in the Respondent['s] court. If the intimidation and threats were not brought to the attention of the State for investigation, and if the State was not in a position to know about them, it would be inappropriate to hold the State responsible. 77. Having said that, the question is, could the Complainant still have exhausted local remedies or better still, is he required to exhaust local remedies, even outside the Respondent State? 78. The first test that a local remedy must pass is that it must be available to be exhausted. The word "available" means "readily obtainable; accessible"10 ; or "attainable, reachable; on call, on hand, ready, present; . . . convenient, at one's service, at one's command, at one's disposal, at one's beck and call."11 79. According to this Commission, a remedy is considered to be available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediments or if he can make use of it in the circumstances of his case.12 Were there remedies available to the Complainant even from outside the Respondent State? 80. The State indicates that in terms of its laws, a Complainant need not be physically present in the country in order to access local remedies, adding that both the High Court Act and the Supreme Court Act permit any person to make an application to either court through his/her lawyer. In support of this, the State cites the Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka Case where the victims were tortured by State agents, and they applied for compensation while they were both in the United Kingdom and succeeded in their claim. The State concluded that the Complainant is not barred from pursuing remedies in a similar manner. 81. The Complainant does not dispute the availability of local remedies in the Respondent State, but argues that in his particular case, having fled the country for fear of his life, and now out of the country, local remedies are not available to him. 82. This Commission holds the view that having failed to establish that he left the country involuntarily due to the acts of the Respondent State, and in view of the fact that under Zimbabwe law, one need not be physically in the country to access local remedies; the Complainant cannot claim that local remedies are not available to him. 83. The Complainant argues that even if local remedies were available, they were not effective because the State has the tendency of ignoring court rulings taken against it, citing among others the High Court decision in the Commercial Farmers Union Case and the Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka case, and added that the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights has documented at least 12 instances where the State has ignored court rulings since 2000. 84. It is not enough for a Complainant to simply conclude that because the State failed to comply with a court decision in one instance, it will do the same in their own case. Each case must be treated on its own 10