interpretive mandate may be exercised. It is unclear whether Article 27 confers a general interpretive mandate or whether it confines the exercise of this mandate to specific instances. The title proceeding the Article, labelled 'interpretation', lends support to a finding that this provision functions as the general interpretive clause under the Maputo Protocol, which means that it confers the authority to interpret the Protocol without being prescriptive. However, the provision is expressed in a manner that suggests a qualification in the exercise of this authority. Understandably, not all 'matters' of interpretation arise from the 'application and implementation of the Protocol.' 82. Interrogating the Commission's understanding of its interpretive mandate under the African Charter may prove instructive in appreciating the importance of the above distinction. The Commission in ACHPR/Res. 402 (LXIII) 201834 1reiterates that its interpretive mandate is inherent in its promotional and protective mandates as set out by the Charter'. Reason being, the Commission recognizes that treaty interpretation pervades every aspect of its work, be it contentions or non-cnntentious, promotional or protective. As such, while the Commission exercises its interpretive mandate during consideration of Communications, )t does likewise during the adoption of general comments and even when considering State reports. As such, the Commission cannot effectively fulfil its protective or promotional mandate in the absence of .an interpretive mandate. For this reason, Article 45(3) of the African Charter is cited as the source of the Commission's general interpretive mandate even though a strict reading of its terms seems to limit the exercise of this authority to those instances expressly requested by State Parties or organization of the AU. 83. From that analysis, if the above p:rovisions of the Maputo Protocol were to be understood as conferring a general interpretive mandate, then the functions of the body concerned as outlined in their founding treaties would delimit the instances in which this authority is exercised. However, if the provisions only authorize the interpretation of the treaty in specific instances, as it does with the submission of Communications, the question that arises is whether a bod.y may claim to exercise an interpretive mandate over the Protocol outside the Communications procedure. Considering that the Commission has issued three General Comments on the Maputo Protocol, instruments which offer an authoritative interpretation of its provisions, questions may abound as to the source of authority derived for such an undertaking. 84. Nevertheless, when adopting the above General Comments, the Commission based its interpretive mandate on the provisions of Article 45(1) (b) of the African Charter, not the Protocol, even though the latter per its terms refers solely to the African Charter. If the Commission is empowered to derive it§._ ---- 1/. O" Hl/h/ 4 1\, r /,,t' . 34 .(,c,'~ / 3 llz I ,J,i, .:>'~'i1L Pe l· le. ' Resolution on the interpretive and prote cti ve mandates of th e African Commission on Hum. Rights -q <-c,Rc 4f?.,4 ,- 0 -0 <! 1 •~ n ' u-- 0 q1 ~ • .1. <"o-<) ·~~-·.\ C!r. I~ .i: "/j, W I' ' ·; .A U L}A f115 . :rn ~V\I\'. o 11 •· \·,• ~ f i ,p"' "'·, / ""(,j¥ OJ\, - 'i>,;c, <:, -J>,. ( i ,'n -'lJ'R/CA\N'i:•;f' "k14 ·1:f< , ' f.: ET DES l'Y ,, " ::::--,-. ;;;;;::-::-:';..,-'