with respect to a supplementary treaty, especially where the latter establishes a petition or complaints system. 78. The above is even more applicable in the case of the Maputo Protocol, which is distinguishable from other similarly situated instruments such as the Court Protocol and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. As suggested by Viljoen, the Protocol is distinct in that it is primarily a substantive rather than a procedural supplement to the Charter. Additionally, the Children's Charter and the Court Protocol explicitly establish a mechanism for overseeing their implementation and outline the functions of these mechanisms. Also, considering that the Commission may appear before the Court as an interested party, it is by operation of logic not appropriately situated to interpret the Court Protocol which outlines the functions of the Court. 79. Indeed, the Commission has already confirmed its competence to interpret the Maputo Protocol notwithstanding the establishment of the Court. Specifically, the Commission has adopted three General Comments interpreting the substantive provisions of the Maputo Protocol. Namely, General Comments No.1 on Article 14(1) (d) and (e) of the Maputo Protocol; General Comment No.2 on Article 14.1 (A), (B), (C) and (F) and Article 14.2 (A) and (C) of the Maputo Protocol; and Joint General Comment of the African Commission and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACREWC) on Ending Child . Marriage. These General Comments were adopted on 6 November 2012; 28 November 2014 and 8 February 2018 respectively sometime after the establishment of the Court as interpreted herein. In all three General Comments, the Commission claims that its competence to adopt General Comments under the Maputo Protocol is derived from Article 45 (1) (b) of the African Charter and that "as a complementary legal instrument to the African Charter ... the [Maputo Protocol] by necessary implications falls within the Commission's interpretative scope" . 80. This Commission is mindful of the thin distinction between advisory jurisdiction and contentious jurisdiction. For example, in contrast to its contentious jurisdiction, the Inter-American Court has the jurisdiction to furnish advisory opinions with respect to treaties other than the American Convention or other applicable Inter-American instruments33 . As such, an argument could be made that the Commission may exercise other interpretive jurisdictions under the Maputo Protocol, such as the adoption of general comments, except for its contentious jurisdiction.