frirrn view of the elements on file, vitiate the whole of the trial at its various stages. But in the-event of a series of substantial violations, the condition of "exceptional or compeiling circumstances" is met tf'" full restitution order should be made in the "nO form of an order foi- release or resumption of the trial ln accordance with the norms and international standards of fair trial. 15. The violation of the Applicant's right to legal aid, in addition to not fundamentally vitiating the outcome of the trial, is not, in my opinion, an "exceptional or compelting circumstance" which could have led to the Court to order restitution such of the Applicant or resumption of the trial. o as release 16. ln my opinion, there ate "exceptional or compelling circumstances" if, and only if, the violation affects a fundamental human right or if there is a cascade of violations, which would have had irreparable consequences which would have substantially vitiated the outcome of the trial. ln the remedies ordered by the Court, there must always be proportionality between the seriousness of the human rights abuses, the nature, the magnitude and scope of the remedies" The Court took the welcome initiative in the present judgment to offer some examples of "exceptional or compelling circumstances". For the Court, and I fully agree,"this would be the case, for example, if the applicant sufficientty demonstrates or the Court itsetf esfab/rshes, o from these circumstances that the arrest or conviction of the appticant is based fully on arbitrary considerations and that his continued imprisonment would result in a denial of justice'(S 82). 17. ln my opinion, the crucial criterion for determining the nature and magnitude of reparation measures is the proportionality between the violations found, and the remedy or measures determined. The more serious the violations, or more numerous the violations, the more the reparation must come closer to full restitution such as an order for release or the reopening of proceedings, etc. 18. ln instant case, the violation as indicated did not "affect the outcome [of] the trial". Reparation for the violation of Article 7(1) (c) of the Charter established by the Court can, in my opinion, only be resolved by pecuniary compensation, and this is what the Court has done for the first time, by awarding the applicant a lump sum 6lPage @-