free and fair elections, its composition must be balanced”.'® The issue of a balanced composition of the electoral body is discussed further below. 172. The Court also considers that the allegations relating to the allegiance of the National Human government Rights should Council and be substantiated the and Higher Judicial demonstrated Council and not be with the limited to mere affirmations without objective evidence. It therefore dismisses them. 173. Furthermore, despite that the Respondent State did not offer any justification for the presence of the personality proposed by the President of the Respondent State and the Minister in charge of Territorial Administration, the Court cannot accept the unsubstantiated allegation that these personalities will undeniably carry out the instructions and orders of the proposing entity. b. Appointment procedure of the members of the electoral body 174. Regarding the procedure for appointing members to the electoral body, the Court does not see how a priori it undermines the independence and impartiality of the electoral body. It is certainly reasonable to argue that relationships of dependency between an entity and its representative in an electoral body may reduce the overall independence of the electoral body. However, it is exactly in this vein that the Respondent State “strengthened” the independence and impartiality of the electoral body, as provided for in Article 17 of the ACDEG, through the adoption of the new law by further reducing the direct link between the proposing entity and the appointed member through a new method of appointment. 175. On the criteria for determining which opposition parties and CSOs propose members guaranteed by any for the electoral body, national law. The to invite to the Court notes that they Court further observes that are not it is the Respondent State that decides which opposition parties and umbrella or platform 16 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de Homme 668, § 125. (APDH) v. Céte d'ivoire (merits) (2016) 1 AfCLR 38