stake in the outcome of the electoral process and this contradicts the requirement
of an absence of bias.
137. The Applicants also find the presence of the members
Commission
in the Central Electoral
proposed by the Higher Judicial Council and the National Human
Rights Council unjustified since these bodies can be considered as being aligned
with the ruling party. Lastly, the Applicants consider the presence of the members
proposed by the President of the Respondent State and the Minister in charge of
Territorial Administration
unwarranted
as these
undeniably
instructions
and
execute
the
members,
orders
of
the
in their view,
will
President
the
of
Respondent State.
138. The Applicants further note that the new law foresees a change in the method of
appointing members to the electoral body. In the former law, the electoral body
was composed of various representatives from different appointing entities. The
current
law
However,
provides
in
the
for
different
Applicants’
view
entities
to
nothing
has
“propose”
members
fundamentally
instead.
changed;
a
relationship of subordination remains or in other words a “dependency” between
the proposing entity and the appointed member, which undermines the principle
of “independence”.
139. The Applicants also point out that even within this new system of “proposing”
members instead of them “representing” certain entities, these proposals are still
subject
to
inordinate
the
government’s
influence
from
the
approval,
which
government,
emphasises
undermining
the
once
more
principle
the
of an
independent electoral body.
140. The Applicants further contend that there is insufficient transparency about the
principles, based on which the government decides which civil society groups
and opposition parties are invited to make membership proposals. Similarly, they
argue that there is an absence of competence criteria for appointing members to
the electoral body. For them, selection and competence criteria of members
are
important guarantees of the independence and impartiality of the members of the
electoral body which the Respondent State failed to provide.
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