00{ t42 from the $ame facts had already been taken into account by the Court, so that no other pecuniary compensation should have been granted to him in this regard. 13' The only pecuniary compensation for the Applicant should have been only related to the second aspect of the alleged moral prejudice, that is, the moral suffering experiencer! by the Applicant as a resu/f of the anguish resutting from the nsk of destruction of hrs enferprises, his {ife in exile and the risk of imprisonment if h* raturned fo his counf4y. And in our opinion, the amount of reparation for this aspeet of moral prejudice ought to have been symbolic and far lower than the amount granted by the Court- Here once more, in my opinion, the Court has demonstrated unjustified generosity. 14. ln conclusion on the two issues of disagreement, I hold the view that pecuniary reparation for prejudice legitimately found by the Court rnust remain what it is, that is, a measure of aimple compensationl, and not a source of enrichment lor the beneficiary. Judge G6rard Niyungeko rSee,inferalia,Dictionnairededroitinternaffonal,JeanSalmon,ed.,Bruxelles,Bruylant,200l,p $75:'ln its general meaning, reparation consists in re-gstablishing an earlier situatbn after a prejudice either by reinslating things as they were before or through compensation for the prejudice suffered" [translation is oursJ. 4