th 19.During its 28 Session, the Respondent State and Counsel for the complainant presented their written and oral submissions before the Commission. Law Admissibility 20. Article 56.5 of the Charter stipulates that “communications relating to human and peoples’ rights…received by the Commission shall be considered if they…are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged…” 21. It is apparent from an examination of the documents appended to the dossier that the verdict th handed down on 25 September 1997, by the Ngozi Court of Appeal, sentencing Mr Gaëtan Bwampamye to death was confirmed on 5 October of the same year by the Supreme Court of Burundi. The Commission notes, consequently, that the domestic remedies had been duly exhausted. For these reasons, it declares the communication admissible. 22. In its oral submission, the respondent state argued that the Complainant had not exhausted other local remedies which include "le recours dans l' interet de la loi", revision and the plea for pardon. 23. The Commission however holds the view that the Complainant could only benefit from the first two remedies at the initiative of the Ministry of Justice and also as a result of discovery of new facts that may lead to reopening the file. With regard to the plea for pardon, it is not a judicial remedy but serves to affect the execution of a sentence. For these reasons the Commission maintains its decision on admissibility. Merits 24. Article 7 (1) (c) of the Charter states: “Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises…the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice". th 25. In its verdict of 5 October 1997, the Supreme Court of Burundi adjudged and stated: “Whereas this Court is of the view that the law implies no obligation on the part of the judge to nominate a lawyer, though he may do so; Whereas in the case under consideration, the accused had th always been assisted by a lawyer, proof being that his 19 page written plea of 20 August was filed by his lawyer; and that they had appeared together at the public sitting; Whereas, in view of such situation, the appellant has no reason to claim that the judge should appoint a lawyer for him, since he already had one who had performed all essential functions of a lawyer for him; this procedure is, therefore, also hereby rejected…” 26. The Commission recalls that the right to fair trial involves fulfilment of certain objective criteria, including the right to equal treatment, the right to defence by a lawyer, especially where this is called for by the interests of justice, as well as the obligation on the part of courts and tribunals to conform to international standards in order to guarantee a fair trial to all. The Commission shall examine the verdict of the Ngozi Court of Appeal, as well as that of the Supreme Court in light of the above criteria. 27. The right to equal treatment by a jurisdiction, especially in criminal matters, means, in the first place, that both the defence and the public prosecutor shall have equal opportunity to prepare and present their pleas and indictment during the trial. Simply put, they should argue their cases before the jurisdiction on an equal footing. Secondly it entails the equal treatment of all accused persons by jurisdictions charged with trying them. This does not mean that identical treatment should be meted to all accused. The idea here is the principle that when objective facts are alike, the response of the judiciary should also be similar. There is a breach of the principle of equality if judicial or administrative decisions are applied in a discriminatory manner. In the case under consideration, it is expected of the Commission to attend to the first aspect, that is, observation of the rule of equality of the means utilised by the defence and the prosecution. 28. The right to defence also implies that at each stage of the criminal proceedings, the accused and his counsel should be able to reply to the indictment of the public prosecutor and should, in any case, be the last to intervene before the court retires for deliberations.