sedition or high treason and there would be no talk of criminal defamation. The State's duty to enforce the obligation on an individual under Article 27(2) of the Charter to exercise rights "with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest" cannot justify the criminilization of expression of speech by way of criminal defamation laws of any kind, whether punishable by incarceration or not. Access to civil action, civil sanction, together with specifically defined crimes for safeguarding national security, public peace and the common interest, should be sufficient. For this Court to hold otherwise would not only be a step backward in the evolution of human rights in Africa, but also out of consonance with the letter and spirit of the Charter, which it is established to uphold. 5. Finally, given our view that the Applicant's conviction was in the first place invalid, it is immaterial whether the punishments imposed are excessive or lenient. There should have been no punishment based on criminal defamation at all; the aggrieved person should have resorted to other avenues than to criminal recourse. That being our view, we would therefore frame the Orders differently, as follows: (A) Articles 109 and 110 of the Burkina be Information Code, as well as Article178 of the Burkinabe Penal Code, are in conflict with Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and therefore invalid;