8 62. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act, provides for the right to apply to the High Court for redress. It stipulates that: “If any person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 12 to 29 of the Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, he may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the High Court for redress.” 63. Looking at the content of both Article 30(4) of the Tanzanian Constitution and Section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act, they are all geared towards the option of bringing matters to the High Court for redress. This option was exploited because the matter was considered by the High Court before later referred to the Court of Appeal. 64. Furthermore, the ‘remedies’ referred to in Article 56.5 include all judicial remedies that are easily 9 accessible for justice. The Commission in INTERIGHTS and others v Mauritania, declared:‘The fact remains that the generally accepted meaning of local remedies, which must be exhausted prior to any communication/complaint procedure before the African Commission, are ordinary remedies of 10 common law that exist in jurisdictions and normally accessible to people seeking justice.”47 65. In this regard, what is important to the African Commission in determining whether local remedies were exhausted is whether judicial remedies indeed exists, and if so, whether they were explored by the Complainants. On this ground, the Respondent State’s reliance on the provisions of Article 30(4) of the Constitution of Tanzania and Section 4 of the Act is not enough to conclude that the Complainants did not exhaust local remedies. 66. Based on the above reasoning, this Commission holds that local remedies have been exhausted by the Complainants in compliance with Article 56.5 of the African Charter. 67. Article 56.6 of the Charter states that, “communications received by the Commission will be considered if they are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted, or from the date the Commission is seized with the matter.” The Respondent State asserts that the Complainants have not complied with this requirement because “this matter was decided fifteen years ago…”. 68. The African Charter does not specifically state what it means by “reasonable time”, as opposed to Article 46(1(b) of theAmerican Convention on Human Rights (the American Convention), which 11 provides for a six months period. In the absence of this specification, the Commission has always ruled based on the contexts and characteristics of each case. 12 69. In Michael Majuru v Zimbabwe, for instance, the communication was submitted to the African Commission twenty-months (22) after the Complainant allegedly fled the Respondent State without approaching the Courts therein. As reasons for delay, he argued without substantiating that he had been undergoing psychotherapy while in South Africa. He further indicated that he did not have the financial means to bring the case before the Commission, and that he was afraid for the safety of members of his family. 70. In the above communication, the African Commission held that the communication was not submitted within a reasonable time period envisaged in Article 56.6 because, “the arguments advanced by the Complainant as impediments for his late submission of the complaint do not appear convincing.” It added that, “Even if the Commission accepts that he fled the country and needed time to settle, or that he was concerned for the safety of his relatives, twenty two (22) months after fleeing 13 the country is clearly beyond a reasonable man’s understanding of reasonable period of time.” 14 71. Similarly, in Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v Republic of Sudan, the African Commission held that a period of twenty nine (29) months (2 years and 5 months) between the time when the High Court dismissed the matter and when the communication was submitted to the African Commission is unreasonable, particularly because the Complainants did not give any compelling reason to explain the delay. It stated that, “Where there is a good and compelling reason why a Complainant does not submit his Complaint to the Commission for consideration, the Commission has a responsibility, for the sake of fairness and justice, to give such a Complainant an opportunity to be heard. In the present case, there is no sufficient reason given as to why the communication could not 15 be submitted within a reasonable period.” 16 72. However, in Mr Obert Chinhamo v Zimbabwe, the communication was submitted to the African Commission ten months after the Complainant allegedly fled from his country. Due to the