DE CUBBER v. BELGIUM JUGDMENT 12 has no reason to doubt the impartiality of the member of the judiciary who had conducted the preliminary investigation (see paragraph 25 above), it recognises, having regard to the various factors discussed above, that his presence on the bench provided grounds for some legitimate misgivings on the applicant’s part. Without underestimating the force of the Government’s arguments and without adopting a subjective approach (see paragraphs 25 and 28 above), the Court recalls that a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) - notably in regard to observance of the fundamental principle of the impartiality of the courts - would not be consonant with the object and purpose of the provision, bearing in mind the prominent place which the right to a fair trial holds in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention (see the above-mentioned Delcourt judgment, Series A no. 11, pp. 14-15, para. 25 in fine). B. The Government’s first alternative plea 31. In the alternative, the Government submitted, at the hearings on 23 May 1984, that the Court should not disregard its previous case-law; they relied essentially on the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981 and on the Albert and Le Compte judgment of 10 February 1983. In both of these judgments, the Court held that proceedings instituted against the applicants before the disciplinary organs of the Ordre des médecins (Medical Association) gave rise to a "contestation" (dispute) over "civil rights and obligations" (Series A no. 43, pp. 20-22, paras. 44-49, and Series A no. 58, pp. 14-16, paras. 27-28). Since Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) was therefore applicable, it had to be determined whether the individuals concerned had received a hearing by a "tribunal" satisfying the conditions which that Article lays down. Their cases had been dealt with by three bodies, namely a Provincial Council, an Appeals Council and the Court of Cassation. The European Court did not consider it "indispensable to pursue this point" as regards the Provincial Council, for the reason which, in its judgment of 23 June 1981, was expressed in the following terms: "Whilst Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) embodies the ‘right to a court’ ..., it nevertheless does not oblige the Contracting States to submit ‘contestations’ (disputes) over ‘civil rights and obligations’ to a procedure conducted at each of its stages before ‘tribunals’ meeting the Article’s various requirements. Demands of flexibility and efficiency, which are fully compatible with the protection of human rights, may justify the prior intervention of administrative or professional bodies and, a fortiori, of judicial bodies which do not satisfy the said requirements in every respect; the legal tradition of many member States of the Council of Europe may be invoked in support of such a system." (Series A no. 43, pp. 22-23, paras. 50-51) The judgment of 10 February 1983 developed this reasoning further: