DE CUBBER v. BELGIUM JUGDMENT 10 27. Application of these principles led the European Court, in its Piersack judgment, to find a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1): it considered that where an assize court had been presided over by a judge who had previously acted as head of the very section of the Brussels public prosecutor’s department which had been responsible for dealing with the accused’s case, the impartiality of the court "was capable of appearing open to doubt" (ibid., pp. 15-16, para. 31). Despite some similarities between the two cases, the Court is faced in the present proceedings with a different legal situation, namely the successive exercise of the functions of investigating judge and trial judge by one and the same person in one and the same case. 28. The Government put forward a series of arguments to show that this combination of functions, which was unquestionably compatible with the Judicial Code as construed in the light of its drafting history (see paragraph 20, first sub-paragraph, above), was also reconcilable with the Convention. They pointed out that in Belgium an investigating judge is fully independent in the performance of his duties; that unlike the judicial officers in the public prosecutor’s department, whose submissions are not binding on him, he does not have the status of a party to criminal proceedings and is not "an instrument of the prosecution"; that "the object of his activity" is not, despite Mr. De Cubber’s allegations, "to establish the guilt of the person he believes to be guilty" (see paragraph 44 of the Commission’s report), but to "assemble in an impartial manner evidence in favour of as well as against the accused", whilst maintaining "a just balance between prosecution and defence", since he "never ceases to be a judge"; that he does not take the decision whether to commit the accused for trial - he merely presents to the chambre du conseil, of which he is not a member, objective reports describing the progress and state of the preliminary investigations, without expressing any opinion of his own, even assuming he has formed one (see paragraphs 52-54 of the Commission’s report and the verbatim record of the hearings held on 23 May 1984). 29. This reasoning no doubt reflects several aspects of the reality of the situation (see paragraphs 15, first sub-paragraph, 17 in fine and 18 above) and the Court recognises its cogency. Nonetheless, it is not in itself decisive and there are various other factors telling in favour of the opposite conclusion. To begin with, a close examination of the statutory texts shows the distinction between judicial officers in the public prosecutor’s department and investigating judges to be less clear-cut than initially appears. An investigating judge, like "procureurs du Roi and their deputies", has the status of officer of the criminal investigation police and, as such, is "placed under the supervision of the procureur général"; furthermore, "an investigating judge" may, in cases "where the suspected offender is deemed to have been caught in the act", "take directly" and in person "any action