M.S.S. v. BELGIUM AND GREECE JUDGMENT 44 2. Merits (a) Reiteration of the general principles 216. The Court reiterates that the confinement of aliens, accompanied by suitable safeguards for the persons concerned, is acceptable only in order to enable States to prevent unlawful immigration while complying with their international obligations, in particular under the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights. States’ legitimate concern to foil the increasingly frequent attempts to circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive asylum-seekers of the protection afforded by these conventions (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 43, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III). 217. Where the Court is called upon to examine the conformity of the manner and method of the execution of the measure with the provisions of the Convention, it must look at the particular situations of the persons concerned (see Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, § 100, 24 January 2008). 218. The States must have particular regard to Article 3 of the Convention, which enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim’s conduct (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). 219. The Court has held on numerous occasions that to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, for example, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000-XI). 220. The Court considers treatment to be “inhuman” when it was “premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering” (ibid., § 92). Treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance (ibid., § 92, and Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 52, ECHR 2002-III). It may suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others (see, among other authorities, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 32, Series A no. 26). Lastly, although the question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor