judgment, and in those related to the Cases of Fernández Ortega, Rosendo Cantú, Montiel and Cabrera García and Flores, the Mexican judges (as organs of the Mexican State) have “direct” obligations that must be fulfilled "immediately" and "ex officio", as discussed below. 73. It should not be overlooked that the judgments delivered against the Mexican State emphasize that standards must be “interpreted” bearing in mind the objective pursued by Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, namely, to “give effect” to the rights and freedoms enshrined in that instrument. This conventional provision establishes that “the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.” Thus, the phrase “or other measures" also includes “constitutional interpretations” that allow for rights to be applied with greater effectiveness and scope, in terms of the pro homine principle enshrined in Article 29 of the Pact of San Jose. This could lead to considerations to supersede the jurisprudential criteria established by the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice. 74. A Mexican Court considered that the pro homine principle is of “obligatory application,” because it is contemplated in international treaties that form part of the Supreme Law of the Union, under the terms of Article 133 of the Federal Constitution. This was established by the Fourth Collegiate Court on Administrative Matters of the First Circuit when it ruled in the direct amparo 202/2004, on October 20, 2004, producing thesis I.4º.A.464 A, with the following title and text: 101 PRO HOMINE PRINCIPLE: ITS APPLICATION IS OBLIGATORY. The pro homine principle, which means that the legal interpretation should always seek the greatest benefit for the individual, that is, it should apply the most comprehensive standard or the broadest interpretation when addressing protected rights and, on the contrary, apply the most restricted standard or narrowest interpretation when an attempt is made to limit its exercise, is contemplated in Article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on May 7 and 20, 1981, respectively. However, since these treaties form part of the Supreme Law of the Union under Article 133 of the Constitution, it is clear that this principle must be applied on a mandatory basis. (Emphasis added). 75. The “constitutional” and “legal” interpretations made by judges and organs that impart justice in Mexico at all levels, must be based not only on the international instruments to which the State of Mexico is a party, but also on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court. This is because it is the court of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights at the international level, whose jurisdiction is the application and interpretation of the American Convention. This body actually determines the content of the text of the Convention, in such a way that the interpreted provision acquires direct effectiveness in Mexico, since this State has signed the Convention and has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. As established in the Judgment in the Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, which has prompted this Concurring Opinion (and which applies to the other three cases mentioned): 101 Published in Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Ninth Period, TCC, Tome XXI, February 2005, p. 1744. 27