laws on detention must be clear, accessible and precise, consistent with international standards and respect the rights of the individual.89 280. Due to its broad nature as well as the lack of clarity on what constitutes acts which endanger security and public order, the Emergency Law lacks predictability and precision. 281. The Commission however rejects as unfounded the Complainants’ argument that the Emergency Law does not require a detainee to be officially charged and brought to trial. The Commission finds that Article 3(bis) of the Emergency Law provides that those arrested or detained shall be provided in writing with the reasons for their arrest or detention. Article 3(bis) also provides for the judicial process whereby an arrest or detention may be challenged before the Courts. 282. The Commission is nonetheless cognizant of the fact that law and practice may differ. The Commission observes that the Complainants allege that the Victim was not availed with basic procedural rights of arrested and detained persons including: the right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest and the charges against him; the right to be brought promptly before a judicial authority which can determine whether sufficient legal reasons existed for his arrest and whether detention before trial was necessary; the right of freedom from torture and other ill-treatment; and the right to fair trial, amongst others.90 The Commission notes that these allegations are consistent with the practices highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism following his mission to Egypt in 2009 and other reports by human rights bodies. 283. The Commission also observes that the Emergency Law sets aside the regulations stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Code, thus removing some of the safeguards provided in the Criminal Procedure Code, in effect allowing law enforcement officials to bypass some of the basic protections afforded to arrested and detained persons.91 For example, while the Emergency Law allows detainees to challenge or appeal an arrest or detention, it does not provide for the Luanda Guidelines, (n 78 above), Guideline, 2 (a). The Commission has previously held that: a person may not be arrested for vague reasons and upon mere suspicions; a prolonged detention without trial is arbitrary; detention for an indefinite period of time is a violation of Article 6 of the Charter; the detention of individuals without charge or trial is a clear violation of Articles 6 and 7 (1) (a) and (d). See respectively Communication No. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 - Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan (1999) ACHPR para 59; Communication 416/12 - Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v. Cameroon, (2015) ACHPR, para 119; Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and 100/93 - Free Legal Assistance Group and others v. DRC (1995), para 42; Communications 143/95-150/96 - Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (1999) ACHPR, para 28. 91 The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism states that Article 3 of the Emergency Law authorizes the conduct of counter-terrorism operations without restrictions by ordinary legislation which would guarantee, for example, that arrest and detention require judicial authorization, and that detention is limited in accordance with specific legal criteria that regulate its duration. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism (n 52 above), para 7. 89 90 45