Consequently, there is no doubt that the Applicant, Hadijatou Mani Koraou, was held in slavery for almost nine (9) years, in violation of the legal prohibition of such practice. 81. In Niger's criminal law, just as is evident in international instruments, the prohibition and stamping out of slavery are inviolable and fall within public policy. As was asserted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Barcelona Traction Judgment (5 February 1970), "Outlawing slavery is an erga omnes obligation binding on all organs of the State." 82. Consequently, the national judge who sat at the Konni High Court upon the case relating to persons whose condition was akin to that of Hadijatou Mani Koraou, was under an obligation to raise at the first instance, the issue of slavery and set in motion the procedure for stamping out such a practice, once the case brought to light an obvious issue of slavery. 83. In conclusion, as regards this particular point above, the Court finds that, the national judge of Niger before whom the case of Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. El Hadj Souleymane Naroua was brought, instead of denouncing the slavery status of the Applicant, as constituting a violation of Article 270 (1) to (5) of the Penal Code of Niger as amended by Law No. 2003-025 of 13 June 2003, rather affirmed that, "The marriage of a free man with a slave woman is licit, in as far as he does not have the means of marrying a free woman, and if he fears falling into fornication". 84. The Court considers that, acknowledging thus the status of Hadijatou Mani Korao as a slave, without denouncing that condition constitutes a form of acceptance, or at least a tolerance of this crime, against which the domestic judge of Niger was under obligation to ensure that proceedings were instituted or that sanctions were preferred where necessary. 85. The Court further considers that even if the Applicant's condition of being a slave arises from a supposedly customary or personal context, there was an avenue of protection open to her from the authorities of the Republic of Niger, be they administrative or judicial. And that, consequently, the Defendant becomes responsible, in terms of both national and international law, for every form of human rights violation against the Applicant, on the basis of slavery, as a result of the tolerance, passiveness, inaction, and abstention of these same authorities of Niger vis-?-vis the practice of slavery. 86. Ultimately, by failing to raise an instant charge regarding an act prohibited as a public policy, and in omitting to adopt or have adopted the appropriate measures for stamping out such prohibited act, the national judge of Niger has not carried out his mandate of protecting the rights of Hadijatou Mani Koraou, and has thereby committed the Defendant into becoming liable on the same scale as the State administrative authority, when the latter declared that: "Listen, as for me, I can do nothing - you must go away." 87. Besides, by relying on international texts, notably, Article 7 (1) - c × Crimes against humanity 1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (c) Enslavement; and - g × (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Applicant maintained that her status of being a slave is a crime against humanity. 88. If it is true that slavery features on the list of acts constituting crimes against humanity, it is nevertheless worthy to indicate that, for it to constitute a crime against humanity, the slavery in question must form part of a "widespread or systematic attack" as enshrined in Article 7 × Crimes against humanity 1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 11