40 occurred in the context of a situation in which the soldiers were questioning the victim and did not obtain a response to the information they required (supra paras. 82 and 108). Without denying the possibility that there were also other objectives, the Court considers it proven that, in the present case, the rape had the specific purpose of punishing the victim because she failed to provide the required information. 128. On the other hand, this Court finds that rape may constitute torture even when it is based in a single fact alone and takes place outside State facilities,116 such as in the victim’s home. This is so because the objective and subjective elements that classify an act as torture do not refer either to the accumulation of facts or to the place where the act is committed, but to the intention, the severity of the suffering, and the purpose of the act, requisites that, in the present case, have been fulfilled. Based on the aforementioned, the Court concludes that the rape in the present case entailed a violation of the personal integrity of Mrs. Fernández Ortega, constituting an act of torture in the terms of Article 5(2) of the American Convention and Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 129. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 11 of the American Convention based on the same facts, the Court has specified that, even though this provision is entitled “Right to Privacy” [Note: it is entitled Protection of Honor and Dignity in Spanish], its contents include, inter alia, the protection of private life.117 Moreover, the concept of private life is a wide-ranging term, which cannot be defined exhaustively,118 but includes, among other protected forums, sexual life,119 and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.120 The Court finds that the rape of Mrs. Fernández Ortega violated essential aspects and values of her private life, represented an intrusion in her sexual life, and annulled her right to decide freely with whom to have intimate relations, causing her to lose total control over these most personal and intimate decisions, and over her basic bodily functions. 121 130. As indicated previously, the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has stated that the definition of discrimination against women “includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman [i] because she is a woman or [ii] that affects women disproportionately.” Furthermore, it has also indicated that “[v]iolence against women is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”122 116 Cf. CAT, Case V.L. v. Switzerland, supra note 115, para. 8.10. 117 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006, Series C No. 148, para. 193; Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panamá. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 55, and Case of Escher et al., supra note 97, para. 113. 118 Cf. ECHR, Case of Niemietz v. Germany, Judgment of 16 December 1992, App. No. 13710/88, para. 29, and Case of Peck v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 January 2003, App. No. 44647/98, para. 57. 119 Cf. ECHR, Case of Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1981, App. No. 7525/76, para. 41, and ECHR, Case of X and Y v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, App. No. 8978/80, para. 22. 120 Cf. ECHR, Case of Niemietz v. Germany, supra note 118, para. 29, and ECHR, Case of Peck v. United Kingdom, supra note 118, para. 57. 121 Cf. ECHR, Case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 104, para. 150, and ICTY, Case of Mucic et. al. “Celebici Camp”. Judgment of November 16, 1998. Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 492 122 Case of González et al., (“Cotton Fields”), supra note 15, para. 395