Institution or any Member of the Community shall be statute barred after three (3) years from the date when the right of action arose,” the present action expressly denoted the date the cause of action arose as ninety-eight (98) years ago. The Defendant has submitted that the action is statute barred therefore inadmissible and further contend that since the matter is statute barred the Court lacks competence to hear the claim. The question to be determined by this Court is whether the cause of action is within the time limit provided for by the rules? 27. The question on the time frame was settled by this Court in the decision of Femi Falana v. Republic of Benin ECW/CCJ/APP/10/07, at paragraph 25 in which it was held that article 9 (3) of the Protocol of the Court, as amended, is a statute of limitation applicable to actions of human rights violations generally. According to the Court, the use of the word “shall” as used in the article denotes a cause of action which arose more than three (3) years before the application for reliefs regarding a violation is statute barred thereby making the relief non-justiciable. However, in spite of the provisions of article 9(3) when it is a case of gross violations under International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16th December, 2005 (Par. 30 & 31), there are instances of exception to the provision in article 9(3) in which case time does not stop running for gross violations under Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. 28. Having reasoned out that there are instances in which the Court can dispense with the application of article 9 (3) as in Alhaji Dr. Man M.B Joof v. President of ECOWAS Commission & Anor ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07 where it was held that “…where an injury is continuing, it will give rise to a cause of action die in diem (day in and out) and postpone the running of time.” It is clear from this decision that we can now begin to understand why the Court employed the purposive approach to interpretation and developed the exception to the rule. 29. The facts in the instant case stated that the Plaintiff’s claim is for land which was acquired forcefully some ninety-eight years ago. The Plaintiff described the act of acquisition as a violation that was unlawful as it did not offer compensation. The Plaintiff supported his claim with pieces of evidence depicting ancestry to the area and a claim of title to the land. He further submitted that the actual body that took acquisition of the land in question was the British Colonial Government but alleged that the Defendant is now liable as they took over from the British Government. 6