PULP MILLS (JUDGMENT) 78 vant, with the guidelines and recommendations of international technical bodies ; (b) not to reduce in their respective legal systems : 1. the technical requirements in force for preventing water pollution, and 2. the severity of the penalties established for violations ; (c) to inform one another of any rules which they plan to prescribe with regard to water pollution in order to establish equivalent rules in their respective legal systems.” 191. Argentina claims that by allowing the discharge of additional nutrients into a river that is eutrophic and suffers from reverse flow and stagnation, Uruguay violated the obligation to prevent pollution, as it failed to prescribe appropriate measures in relation to the Orion (Botnia) mill, and failed to meet applicable international environmental agreements, including the Biodiversity Convention and the Ramsar Convention. It maintains that the 1975 Statute prohibits any pollution which is prejudicial to the protection and preservation of the aquatic environment or which alters the ecological balance of the river. Argentina further argues that the obligation to prevent pollution of the river is an obligation of result and extends not only to protecting the aquatic environment proper, but also to any reasonable and legitimate use of the river, including tourism and other recreational uses. 192. Uruguay contends that the obligation laid down in Article 41 (a) of the 1975 Statute to “prevent . . . pollution” does not involve a prohibition on all discharges into the river. It is only those that exceed the standards jointly agreed by the Parties within CARU in accordance with their international obligations, and that therefore have harmful effects, which can be characterized as “pollution” under Article 40 of the 1975 Statute. Uruguay also maintains that Article 41 creates an obligation of conduct, and not of result, but that it actually matters little since Uruguay has complied with its duty to prevent pollution by requiring the plant to meet best available technology (“BAT”) standards. 193. Before turning to the analysis of Article 41, the Court recalls that : “The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 241-242, para. 29.) 194. The Court moreover had occasion to stress, in the GabčíkovoNagymaros Project case, that “the Parties together should look afresh at 68