PULP MILLS (JUDGMENT) 66 of its waters, the technical reasons on which this conclusion is based and the changes suggested to the plan or programme of operations”. The Court is aware that the negotiation provided for in Article 12 of the 1975 Statute forms part of the overall procedure laid down in Articles 7 to 12, which is structured in such a way that the parties, in association with CARU, are able, at the end of the process, to fulfil their obligation to prevent any significant transboundary harm which might be caused by potentially harmful activities planned by either one of them. 140. The Court therefore considers that the agreement to set up the GTAN, while indeed creating a negotiating body capable of enabling the Parties to pursue the same objective as that laid down in Article 12 of the 1975 Statute, cannot be interpreted as expressing the agreement of the Parties to derogate from other procedural obligations laid down by the Statute. 141. Consequently, the Court finds that Argentina, in accepting the creation of the GTAN, did not give up, as Uruguay claims, the other procedural rights belonging to it by virtue of the 1975 Statute, nor the possibility of invoking Uruguay’s responsibility for any breach of those rights. Argentina did not, in the agreement to set up the GTAN, “effect a clear and unequivocal waiver” of its rights under the 1975 Statute (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 247, para. 13). Nor did it consent to suspending the operation of the procedural provisions of the 1975 Statute. Indeed, under Article 57 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, concerning “[s]uspension of the operation of a treaty”, including, according to the International Law Commission’s commentary, suspension of “the operation of . . . some of its provisions” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 251), suspension is only possible “in conformity with the provisions of the treaty” or “by consent of all the parties”. 142. The Court further observes that the agreement to set up the GTAN, in referring to “the cellulose plants that are being constructed in the Eastern Republic of Uruguay”, is stating a simple fact and cannot be interpreted, as Uruguay claims, as an acceptance of their construction by Argentina. 143. The Court finds that Uruguay was not entitled, for the duration of the period of consultation and negotiation provided for in Articles 7 to 12 of the 1975 Statute, either to construct or to authorize the construction of the planned mills and the port terminal. It would be contrary to the object and purpose of the 1975 Statute to embark on disputed activities before having applied the procedures laid down by the “joint machinery necessary for the optimum and rational utilization of the [r]iver” (Article 1). However, Article 9 provides that : “[i]f the notified party raises no objections or does not respond within the period established in Arti56