PULP MILLS (JUDGMENT) 73 presented to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of international law to those facts which it has found to have existed. B. Alleged Violations of Substantive Obligations 169. The Court now turns to the examination of the alleged violations by Uruguay of its substantive obligations under the 1975 Statute by authorizing the construction and operation of the Orion (Botnia) mill. In particular, Argentina contends that Uruguay has breached its obligations under Articles 1, 27, 35, 36 and 41 (a) of the 1975 Statute and “other obligations deriving from . . . general, conventional and customary international law which are necessary for the application of the 1975 Statute”. Uruguay rejects these allegations. Uruguay considers furthermore that Article 27 of the 1975 Statute allows the parties to use the waters of the river for domestic, sanitary, industrial and agricultural purposes. 1. The obligation to contribute to the optimum and rational utilization of the river (Article 1) 170. According to Argentina, Uruguay has breached its obligation to contribute to the “optimum and rational utilization of the river” by failing to co-ordinate with Argentina on measures necessary to avoid ecological change, and by failing to take the measures necessary to prevent pollution. Argentina also maintains that, in interpreting the 1975 Statute (in particular Articles 27, 35, and 36 thereof) according to the principle of equitable and reasonable use, account must be taken of all pre-existing legitimate uses of the river, including in particular its use for recreational and tourist purposes. 171. For Uruguay, the object and purpose of the 1975 Statute is to establish a structure for co-operation between the Parties through CARU in pursuit of the shared goal of equitable and sustainable use of the water and biological resources of the river. Uruguay contends that it has in no way breached the principle of equitable and reasonable use of the river and that this principle provides no basis for favouring pre-existing uses of the river, such as tourism or fishing, over other, new uses. 172. The Parties also disagree on the scope and implications of Article 27 of the 1975 Statute on the right of each Party to use the waters of the river, within its jurisdiction, for domestic, sanitary, industrial and agricultural purposes. 173. The Court observes that Article 1, as stated in the title to Chapter I of the 1975 Statute, sets out the purpose of the Statute. As such, it informs the interpretation of the substantive obligations, but does not by itself lay down specific rights and obligations for the parties. Optimum and rational utilization is to be achieved through compliance with the obligations prescribed by the 1975 Statute for the protection of the envi63