36. With regard to the obligation to file an application within a reasonable time, the Court notes that Article 56(6) of the Charter does not set a time limit for the filing of cases before it. Rule 40(6) of the Rules, which restates the provisions of Article 56(6) of the Charter, simply requires the Application to "be filed within a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter’. 37.It emerges from the record that local remedies were exhausted on 23 May 2014, with the judgment of the Supreme Court. This is, therefore, the date which must be regarded as the starting point for calculating and assessing the reasonableness of the time, within the meaning of the provisions of Rule 40(6) of the Rules and Article 56(6) of the Charter. 38. The Application was filed at this Court on 24 February 2017, two (2) years, nine (9) months and nine (9) days after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court must therefore determine whether this period is reasonable within the meaning of the Charter and the Rules.. 39.The Court recalls that "the reasonableness depends on the particular circumstances of a time-limit for referral of each case, and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis ..."” 40.The Court has consistently held that the six-month period expressly provided for in other international human rights law instruments cannot be applied under Article 56(6) of the Charter; and Court has therefore adopted a case-by-case approach in assessing the reasonableness of a time limit within the meaning of Article 56(6) of the Charter"®. 7 Beneficiaries of the late Norbert liboudo & Mouvement Burkinabé objections) (2013) 1 AfCLR 197, § § Norbert Zongo ibid. See also the Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablassé, Ernest Zongo and Blaise des droits de I'homme et des peuples v. Burkina Faso (preliminary 121. judgment in Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) op.cit § 73 and 74. 12