004fj68 177. The Respondent State, for its part, submits that it has not violated the principle of non bis in idem for the simple reason that the judgment rendered at first instance was appealed by the Attorney General and is therefore not definitive. It argues that this principle is used in law only to express the fact that an accused tried and acquitted or convicted by a decision not subject to appeal can no longer be prosecuted for the same act. It contends that this principle applies only in cases where the decision has become res judicata. *** 178. The Court notes that although the Charter does not contain any specific provision on the principle of "non bis in idem", this constitutes a general principle of law as reiterated by Article 14(7) of ICCPR which that: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country ". 179. The principle of "non bis in idem" literally means that a person cannot be prosecuted and tried twice by the courts of the same State for an offence for which he has been acquitted or convicted. To assess whether, before CRIET, the Applicant was tried for the same case as that which had been tried by the Cotonou First Class Court of First Instance, the Court takes into account the factual and legal aspects of the matter." 180. As regards the facts, the Court notes that the proceedings before CRIET involved the same parties as those that appeared before the Cotonou First Class Court of First Instance, namely: the Public Prosecutor's Office as prosecutor, the Benin Customs as a civil party, the Applicant and three of his employees as the party accused. Additionally, seized by the Special Prosecutor, CRIET essentially adjudicated the facts and complaints heard by the First Instance Court . Definitively, the two courts heard the same case , that is, the international trafficking of 18 kg of cocaine. The European Court held that the principle of non bis in idem must be understood as "prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a person for a second "offence" in so far as it originated from identical facts or facts which are the same in substance . See ECHR, Applicatio Nos. 186 ; 18647/10 ; 18663/10 ; 19. 18668/10 ; 18698/10 : Great Stevens et a/. Italy, Judgment of llt 3/20, 23 I ~ IV{ .c-: £-. +'_ ~ ~'i«