47. From the facts provided, the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in suit no. 159/09 filed by the Attorney General, effectively annulled the decision on suit no. 127/07. The Attorney General acted on the basis of the special prerogative power conferred by Law no. 22/07 and Decree-Law no. 1/05, through which the Attorney General applied to the Supreme Court without the presence or submissions on the case from the Victim. In response to this, the Victim sought to refer the matter to the Constitutional Council to obtain an assessment and declaration on the unconstitutionality of the norm which granted the special prerogative powers to the Attorney General. The Victim then filed for a stay of the decision in the 4 th Judicial Tribunal of the City of Maputo; however this application was dismissed, with the Judge stating that the application should have been filed with the Supreme Court. 48. The Commission notes that it is a generally accepted principle in international law that before an international body is approached, the applicant must exhaust all available legal domestic remedies.12 The Commission further notes that in order to meet the exhaustion requirement, a victim must have obtained a final decision from the highest court to which recourse is available.13 49. In this regard, the Commission notes that the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Mozambique is a sovereign public office with special jurisdiction to administer justice in matters of a legal-constitutional nature,14 which has the power, inter alia, to evaluate and declare the unconstitutionality of laws and the illegality of normative acts of State offices.15 Judgments of the Constitutional Council are binding on all citizens, institutions and other legal persons, they are not subject to appeal and they prevail over other decisions.16 50. For making a finding on the submissions of the Complainant with respect to exhaustion of local remedies, it is necessary at this point to address two inter-related issues. The first is whether, having regard to the constitutional arrangement of Mozambique’s judicial system, the Complainant could have sought remedy from the Constitutional Council with respect to either or both of the rights of the African Charter allegedly violated. Assuming that such a recourse was a legal possibility, the second issue is then whether the Complainant actually brought the case before the Council. 51. With regards to the alleged violation of Article 7, the Complainant avers that this violation is the result of the special prerogative power which is conferred on the Chidi Anselm Odinkalu and Camilla Christensen, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures,’ Volume 20 Human Rights Quarterly 1998, Pg.256. See also, Communications 54/91 - Malawi African Association v. Mauritania; 61/91 - Amnesty International v. Mauritania; 98/93 - Ms. Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme and RADDHO v. Mauritania; 164/97, 196/97 - Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-droit v. Mauritania; 210/98 Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v. Mauritania. 13 Communication Procedure, Information Sheet No.3, pg.6 14 Id, Article 241(1), 15 Id, Article 244(1)(a); See also Article 6, The Organic Law of the Constitutional Council, Law № 06/2006 16 Id, Article 248 12 8