II     4. As regards Rule 67, paragraph 1, of the Rules, both the French and English versions provide that it is the “party” seeking the revision that must be unaware of the new evidence at the time the judgment was delivered3; it does not mention lack of knowledge of the evidence on the part of the “Court” before the delivery of its judgment. 5. In this respect, it is important to note that the instruments governing the functioning of other international courts and dealing with revision matters4 require that both the Court and the party seeking a revision must have been within the aforesaid lack of knowledge; this is the case under Article 61 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,5 Article 25 of the Protocol establishing the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States,6 and Article 80 (1) of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights.7 This is equally the case under Article 48 (1) of the Protocol on the Statute of the                                                                                                                 3 The French version of Article 28 (3) of the Protocol also provides that the Court may review its decision “en cas de survenance de preuves”, whereas the English version of the same clause provides that the Court may review its decision “in the light of new evidence”; the two linguistic versions of Rule 67, paragraph 1, of the Rules, for their part, refers to the “discovery” (”découverte”) of such an evidence. The aforesaid terminological disparities do not in my view have particular legal consequences in regard to consideration of the admissibility of review applications. 4  The American Human Rights Convention like the Statute and Rules of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights do not contain provisions on the revision of judgments; these aforementioned three instruments only make reference to the issue of interpretation of judgments. See, however, the application for revision of the judgment in the matter of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua filed by the Inter-American Commission but declared inadmissible by the Court in its Order of 13 September 1997, Case of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua (Application for Judicial Review of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs), Order of the Court. 5 “An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence”. 6 “An application for revision of a decision may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the decision was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, provided always that such ignorance was not due to negligence”. 7 “A party may, in the event of the discovery of a fact which might by its nature have a decisive influence and which, when a judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not reasonably have been known to that party, request the Court, within a period of six months after that party acquired knowledge of the fact, to revise that judgment.” The European Human Rights Convention, for its part, does not contain any provision on revision of the judgments of the Court; however, see the jurisprudence of the European Court in this regard, infra, footnote 15.