5- l’obligation de suivre un traitement médical ou une cure de désintoxication, 6- la suspension provisoire du droit de conduire un véhicule à moteur, 7- la suspension provisoire d’un permis de chasse ou d’un permis de port d’arme.” 206. Taking a look at Articles 112 to 124, one does not find in any of them a provision that allows the investigating judge, on a provisional release, to impose a specific obligation or prohibition on an accused in the sense of restricting his freedom of expression. 207. Therefore, the Court found that the Respondent fails to demonstrate the legality of the obligation imposed on the Applicant. 208. And failing to demonstrate such requirement, the need to demonstrate the other requirements is prejudiced, insofar as such failure is sufficient to establish the illegality of the restriction imposed on the exercise of the right in question. 209. Still it should be recalled that the restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression must not jeopardize the right itself and that the general limitation clause in Article 27(2) of the Charter requires that “The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.” 210. As the African Court underlined in the case ISSA KONOTÉ V. BURKINA FASO, Application No. 004/2013: restrictions on freedom of expression can be imposed to safeguard the rights of others, national security, public order, public morals and health (see paragraph 128). 211. Therefore, restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression can only be based on the reasons provided for in Articles 27 (2) of the Charter and 19 (3) of the ICCPR, which were not established herein. 55