19. It is well recognized that conventional international law is derived from international treaties and conventions, and typically demarcated States as the main subjects thereof. Indeed, this was the argument of learned Counsel for the Respondent herein. However, individual persons are increasingly becoming recognized subjects of international law as well in so far as it (international law) imposes certain duties upon States with regard to such persons. Individual persons’ recognition as participants in international law is, nonetheless, subject to the existence of specific provision therefor in an international treaty. In the absence of such provision, an individual person cannot bring a complaint; only a State of which s/he is a national would be mandated to complain of a violation before an international tribunal. 20. Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, we find that the EAC Treaty does make provision for complaints by natural or juridical persons to this Court as outlined in Article 30(1) thereof, and thus recognizes them as subjects of international law in its legal regime. Further, it is quite clear that within the EAC legal regime the Treaty is the primary instrument that outlines the obligations of Partner States in the Community. The ILC Articles, on the other hand, are supplementary rules intended to enable this Court determine the culpability of Partner States for the acts or omissions of their organs. In the present context, the Articles are pertinent to a determination of the Respondent’s culpability for the conduct of the Commission. We are satisfied, therefore, that the said Articles do apply to a dispute brought against a Partner State by a person resident in the Community, and do hereby disallow the submission of learned Counsel for the Respondent to the contrary. REFERENCE No. 10 OF 2013 Page 11