party. 41. The African Commission, however, wishes to assert that it was not invited to interpret Islamic Shariâa Law as obtains in the Criminal Code of the Respondent State. No argument was presented before it nor did the African Commission consider arguments based on the Shariâa Law. The African Commission hereby states that the inquiry before it was confined to the application of the African Charter in the legal system of a State Party to the Charter. 42. There is no right for individuals, and particularly the government of a country to apply physical violence to individuals for offences. Such a right would be tantamount to sanctioning State sponsored torture under the [African] Charter and contrary to the very nature of this human rights treaty. 43. The facts in this communication have not been disputed by the Respondent State. In their oral submissions at the 33rd Ordinary Session, the Respondent State confirmed this by stating that it was the opinion of the Respondent State that it was better for the victims to have been lashed rather than hold them in detention for the said criminal offences and as such deny them of the opportunity to continue with their normal lives. 44. The law under which the victims in this communication were punished has been applied to other individuals. This continues despite the government being aware of its clear incompatibility with international human rights law. Holding For these reasons, the African Commission, Finds the Republic of Sudan violation of Article 5 of the African Charter. Requests the Government of Sudan to: Immediately amend the Criminal Law of 1991, in conformity with its obligations under the African Charter and other relevant international human rights instruments; Abolish the penalty of lashes; and to Take appropriate measures to ensure compensation of the victims. Taken at the 33rd Ordinary Session in Niamey, Niger, May 2003. 1 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 1 (1979-80) at para. 30 × 30. The Court notes first of all that a person may be humiliated by the mere fact of being criminally convicted. However, what is relevant for the purposes of Article 3 (art. 3) is that he should be humiliated not simply by his conviction but by the execution of the punishment which is imposed on him. In fact, in most if not all cases this may be one of the effects of judicial punishment, involving as it does unwilling subjection to the demands of the penal system. However, as the Court pointed out in its judgment of 18 January 1978 in the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom (Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 163), the prohibition contained in Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention is absolute: no provision is made for exceptions and, under Article 15 (2) (art. 15-2) there can be no derogation from Article 3 (art. 3). It would be absurd to hold that judicial punishment generally, by reason of its usual and perhaps almost inevitable element of humiliation, is "degrading" within the meaning of Article 3 (art. 3). Some further criterion must be read into the text. Indeed, Article 3 (art. 3), by expressly prohibiting "inhuman" and "degrading" punishment, implies that there is a distinction between such punishment and punishment in general. In the Courtâs view, in order for a punishment to be "degrading" and in breach of Article 3 (art. 3), the humiliation or debasement involved must attain a particular level and must in any event be other than that usual element of humiliation referred to in the preceding subparagraph. The assessment is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the nature and context of the punishment itself and the manner and method of its execution. and Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur.Ct.H.R. (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (1979-80) at para. 162 4