th 29. The Ngozi Court of Appeal had on 25 September 1997, handed down a verdict sentencing Mr Bwampamye to death, thereby following the prayer of the public prosecutor, paying no heed to the accused’s prayer for adjournment of the case, pleading the absence of his lawyer. The Commission holds the view that the judge should have upheld the prayer of the accused, in view of the irreversible character of the penalty involved. This was all the more imperative considering that during the th 20 August 1997 hearing, he had upheld the arguments of the prosecutor who had refused to proceed with his pleading claiming that he needed time to study the written plea presented by counsel for the accused. The criminal court then decided to adjourn the case to 25 September 1997. The Commission holds that by refusing to accede to the request for adjournment, the Court of Appeal violated the right to equal treatment, one of the fundamental principles of the right to fair trial. 30. The Supreme Court, in its verdict, upholds the position of the lower court judge in refusing to designate a defence lawyer as follows: “… this Court is of the view that the law implies no obligation on the part of the judge to nominate a lawyer, though he may do so” . The Commission emphatically recalls that the right to legal assistance is a fundamental element of the right to fair trial. More so where the interests of justice demand it. It holds the view that in the case under consideration, considering the gravity of the allegations brought against the accused and the nature of the penalty he faced, it was in the interest of justice for him to have the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer at each stage of the case. 31. In its consideration of what appears to be the liberty allowed the judge under Burundian law to designate or not to designate a defence lawyer for the accused, the Commission recalls the fundamental principle enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, that not only do the States Parties recognise the rights, obligations and freedoms proclaimed in the Charter, they also commit themselves to respect them and take measures to give effect to them. In other words, if a State Party fails to ensure respect for the rights contained in the African Charter, this constitutes a violation of the said 1 Charter. (See communication 74/92 para. 35 [sic] . It is apparent, consequently, that Burundian legislation, in this regard, does not comply with the country’s treaty obligations emanating from its status as a State party to the African Charter. The court’s argument flies in the face of a well-known general legal principle, which states that “no one may profit from his own turpitude” . The argument should furthermore be rejected because by considering the various instruments cited in his opening statement by counsel for the accused, the court, though admittedly it does not state a position on them, had become aware of the country’s obligations as regards human rights, especially the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, subsequently, those of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. By upholding the position of the appellate judge, the court ignored the obligation of courts and tribunals to conform to international standards of ensuring fair trial to all. Holding For these Reasons, the Commission Holds a violation of Article 7(1) (c) of the African Charter. Requests Burundi to draw all the legal consequences of this decision; and to take appropriate measures to allow the reopening of the file and the reconsideration of the case in conformity with the laws of Burundi and the pertinent provision of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Calls on Burundi to bring its criminal legislation in conformity with its treaty obligations emanating from the African Charter. rd th Cotonou, Benin, 23 October to 6 November 2000. Footnotes 1. Editor's note: The English language version is generally of shorter length (26 paragraphs in all) and less detailed than the French language version (41 paragraphs).