filming a documentary at the time, they had not been informed of the arrangements for the filming or of the applicant’s presence that night during the operation. The authorisation to film issued by the police chief had been displayed in the office of the squad’s head of station and in the “radio-operations centre” of the police headquarters, with a note stating “for information – filming from 9 to 13 January”, but the document had not mentioned the exact times when the journalists would be accompanying the police. In addition, and most importantly, the heads of station and inspectors on duty in “Unit 101” the day before and at the time of the incident and those in charge of the dog-handling unit had not received any note or memorandum giving that information and had not been otherwise informed. The question whether M.S. and Y.M. had been aware that the police intervention was being followed by a reporter was a decisive point in relation to Article 2, as it could not be excluded that they might have acted differently and the tragic events might have been avoided if they had known about the situation. As shown above, the reason for their being unaware of this could be put down to shortcomings in the flow of information that were attributable to the authorities. Even though the applicant, who could not have been unaware of the risks involved, had probably not acted with all the requisite caution, he had not received any safety instructions on the day of the accident or any order to remain on the sidelines after his arrival at the scene. Having regard to the failure to properly supervise the applicant that was attributable to the authorities, and to the shortcomings in the flow of information, it could not be asserted that the applicant’s imprudent conduct had been the decisive cause of the accident of which he had been victim. In conclusion, the authorities, who had been responsible for his safety in a context where his life was potentially in danger, had not shown all the vigilance that could reasonably be expected of them. This lack of vigilance had been the essential cause of the use, by mistake, of potentially lethal force which had exposed the applicant to a serious risk to life and limb and had resulted in his sustaining serious injury. Accordingly, the use of force had not been absolutely necessary “in defence of any person from unlawful violence”, within the meaning of Article 2 §§ 2 (a). Conclusion: violation (unanimously). (b) Procedural aspect– The authorities had reacted to the events promptly and seriously. Numerous measures had been taken to establish the facts and responsibilities and the investigations had taken place under the supervision of an investigating judge, whose impartiality and independence had not been called into question. The applicant had been kept up to date with the progress of the investigation. In addition, the investigating judge had granted his request for a second reconstruction of the incident, and it was on his own initiative that it had ultimately not taken place. The investigation had thus been carried out in conditions apt to make it possible to determine whether the use of force had been justified or not and to identify who was responsible. There were admittedly a number of periods of inactivity, and it would probably have been desirable for the investigation to be completed more quickly, but in view of the circumstances and the measures taken in this case, that was not sufficient for its effectiveness to be called into question. Conclusion: no violation (unanimously). Article 41: question reserved.

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