34 GUZZARDI v. ITALY JUDGMENT there has been an offence - either criminal or, if appropriate, disciplinary (see the above-mentioned Engel and others judgment, p. 27, par. 68). Moreover, to use "conviction" for a preventive or security measure would be consonant neither with the principle of narrow interpretation to be observed in this area (see paragraph 98 above) nor with the fact that that word implies a finding of guilt. The Court thus reaches the same conclusion as the Commission. 101. The deprivation of liberty complained of was not covered by subparagraph (b) (art. 5-1-b) either. Admittedly, under the procedure laid down by the 1956 Act judicial decisions are a kind of sanction for failure to heed a prior warning (diffida), but the warning is not indispensable if, as in the present case, recourse is had to the 1965 Act; moreover, the warning is issued by the Chief of Police and so does not constitute an "order of a court" (see paragraphs 46 and 52 above). As regards the words "to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law", they concern only those cases where the law permits the detention of a person to compel him to fulfil a "specific and concrete" obligation which he has failed to satisfy (see the above-mentioned Engel and others judgment, p. 28, par. 69). However, as the Commission rightly emphasised, the 1956 and 1965 Acts impose general obligations (see paragraph 103 of the report). 102. Neither was the applicant in one of the situations dealt with by subparagraph (c) (art. 5-1-c). It is true that there was "reasonable suspicion of [his] having committed an offence" and that he remained subject to charges throughout the time he spent on Asinara, but the decisions of the Regional Court (30 January 1975), the Court of Appeal (12 March 1975) and the Court of Cassation (6 October 1975) had no connection in law with the investigation being pursued in his respect: they were based on the 1956 and 1965 Acts which are applicable irrespective of whether or not there has been a charge and do not prescribe any subsequent appearance "before the competent legal authority" (see paragraphs 9, 11, 12, 17, 19, 21 and 45-52 above). Mr. Guzzardi’s detention on remand had terminated on 8 February 1975, on the expiry of the two years’ time-limit laid down by Article 272 (first paragraph, item 2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 10 above). If - as the applicant insinuated but did not prove (see paragraph 73 in fine of the report) - the said Acts had been utilised in order to prolong the detention, it would not in that case have been "lawful"; whilst the French text of sub-paragraph (c), (art. 5-1-c) unlike that of sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) (art. 5-1-a, art. 5-1-b, art. 5-1-d, art. 5-1-e, art. 5-1-f), does not contain the equivalent word "régulière", the English version does speak of "lawful" detention and the principle expressed by this adjective dominates the whole of Article 5 par. 1 (art. 5-1) (see the above-mentioned