46. The African Commission notes that the locus standi requirement is not restrictive so as to imply that only victims may seize the African Commission. In fact, all that Article 56.1 demands is a disclosure of the identity of the author of the communication, irrespective of him/her being the actual victim of the alleged violation. This requirement is conveniently broad to allow submissions not only from aggrieved individuals but also from other individuals or organisations (like NGOs) that can author such complaints and seize the Commission of a human rights violation. The existence of direct interest (like being a victim) to bring the matter before the Commission is not a requirement under the African Charter. The clear rationale here for allowing a broad gateway for complaints under the Charter is the practical understanding, in Africa, that victims may face various difficulties impairing them from approaching the African Commission. That notwithstanding, in the present communication, the present complainants are themselves Bakweri, who allege violation of their ownership of historical lands, and that the counsel himself and the BLCC has been duly authorised, by a resolution of chiefs, to further the interests of the Bakweri, which fact has not been denied by the Respondent State. The Commission adds that one may be represented, through express consent or by the self-initiative of the author who speaks for him/her, irrespective of the fact that it is known to the Commission that one is soundly capable of representing oneself. The Commission holds, thus, that the present Complainant has locus standi and is entitled to bring this communication before the African Commission. 47. To the objection that the Complainant failed to show a prima facie case [the Respondent State alleging that the communication is unclear, interchangeably spoke of various matters, and is improper as it remained deliberately imprecise about the illicit acts], the Complainant avers that it has provided precise allegations of facts supported by relevant documents. The Commission examined the original complaint and its supporting documents. Contrary to the Respondent State's objections, it is evident in the file that the Complainant is indeed clearly alleging the alienation of the Bakweri Lands, which was triggered by the Presidential Decree No. 94/125 of 14th July 1994 where the Government of Cameroon listed the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) which is situate on Bakweri lands. It has alleged that this development will in effect result in the alienation, to private purchasers, of approximately 400 square miles (104,000 hectares) of lands in the Fako division traditionally owned, occupied or used by the Bakweri. The Complainant alleges that the transfer would extinguish the Bakweri (who are a particular ethnic group whose status is never any where disputed by the Respondent State) title rights and interests in two-thirds of the minority group's total land area in violation of Articles 7(1)(a), 14, 21, 22 of the African Charter. In deciding to be seized of this matter at its 32 sup]nd[/sup] Ordinary Session held from 17th to 23rd October 2002 in Banjul, The Gambia the African Commission had found this presentation/narration of violation of rights protected under the Charter to be sufficiently clear to be taken up by the Commission, and hence, finds the present objection of the Respondent State untenable. 48. To the objection that the communication casts such suspicions and aspersions on the Cameroonian judicial system and hence could be considered insulting per Article 56.3 of the African Charter, the African Commission finds that there is nothing in the various submissions of the Complainant to warrant the invocation of Article 56.3 of the African Charter so as to declare the complaint inadmissible on the grounds of its being written in disparaging or insulting language. The Complainant can allege, among others, and as it did with a view to be exempted from exhausting local remedies, that the president of the Republic wielded extraordinary powers so as to influence the judiciary and that the judiciary is impartial and lacked independence. This would be nothing but a mere allegation depicting, as it perceives it, the Complainant's comprehension of the offices that it thought would not provide it with any remedies as the African Commission would demand. Whether the allegations are true is another matter. At best, the Respondent State may, if it so wishes, employ other means to acquaint the African Commission that the situation is indeed otherwise. The African Commission notes, however, that such a rebuttal is not necessary for purposes of examination under Article 56.3. Accordingly, thus, the African Commission finds the Respondent State's objection per Article 56.3 of the African Charter unsustainable. 49. To the objection that the UN Sub-Commission has settled the matter and hence the African Commission should not entertain the matter per Article 56.7 of the African Charter, the Complainant responded saying that the Respondent State failed to distinguish complaints before the African Commission that are pending before another international tribunal from those where the tribunal was seized of the matter but declined to take action. It alleges that the African Commission has indeed addressed this distinction in ACHPR Communication 40/90 Bob Ngozi Njoku/Egypt, which the UN Sub-Commission had decided not to entertain. The African Commission had held that the rejection by the UN Sub-Commission "does not boil down to a decision on the merits of the case and does not in any way indicate that the matter 6