35. On 8 January 2008, the Complainant was informed of the Commission Decision's to defer the Communication to the 43rd Ordinary Session to allow the State submit on the Merits. 36. By Note Verbale of 8 January the Respondent State was informed that it had to submit on the Merits. A copy of the Complainant's submission was also forwarded to Respondent State. The Law Admissibility 37. The Admissibility of communications brought pursuant to Article 55 of the African Charter is governed by the conditions stipulated in Article 56 of the African Charter. This Article lays down seven (7) conditions, which generally must be fulfilled by a Complainant in order for a communication to be declared admissible. 38. Of the seven conditions, the Respondent State claims that the Complainant has failed to fulfil two, namely, Article 56(5) and (6). Consequently, these are the only two provisions of Article 56 that are contentious between the parties in respect of the question of admissibility of the communication. The African Commission will therefore focus on the said provisions only. 39. Article 56(6) of the African Charter provides that communications ... received by the Commission shall be considered if they: are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted, or from the date the Commission is seized with the matter. 40. The Complainant submits that the communication was submitted within a reasonable time in conformity with Article 56(6) of the African Charter. 41. However, the Respondent State argues that the communication cannot be said to have been submitted within a reasonable period from the time domestic remedies were exhausted. The Respondent State asserts that the African Commission has not specified what a reasonable period is, although Information Sheet No. 3 prepared by the Secretariat of the African Commission on Communication Procedures advises that the communication should be submitted 'as early as possible', which begs the question 'what is as early as possible?' 42. The Respondent State therefore requests the African Commission, when determining the question of what is a reasonable period to draw inspiration from Article 32 of the Inter-American Convention which specifies 6 months as the period within which a complaint should be filed. 43. In that case the Respondent State argues, the Complainant's matter would be time barred, as the alleged violations are said to have been committed on 23rd February 2003 and yet the Complainant only brought the communication before the African Commission 16 months later. 44. Indeed, as the Respondent State has noted, the African Commission has not specified what a reasonable period is but it is apparent from its practice that it has tended to be flexible and as such, determines this question on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in several communications, the African Commission has admitted communications that have been brought before the African Commission more than 16 months after the violation is reported to have taken place or domestic remedies were exhausted. Consequently, the African Commission believes that the Complainant in the present communication having filed the communication 16 months after the violation took place, met the conditions laid down in Article 56(6) of the African Charter. 45. The Complainant puts forward the argument that the exception to the rule in Article 56(5) is applicable in this communication because local remedies are unavailable, ineffective and would be unduly prolonged. 46. Article 56(5) of the African Charter provides that Communications ... received by the Commission shall be considered if they: are sent after exhausting domestic remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged. 47. Making reference to communication 71/92, the Complainant argues that the onus is on the Respondent State to demonstrate that local remedies are available. He submits that the African Commission in communications 147/95 and 146/96, noted that a remedy is considered available only if the Complainant can make use of it in the circumstances of his case. The Complainant avers that in the particular circumstances of his case, he is unable to utilise the local remedies mainly because he was forced to flee Zimbabwe for fear of his life. He claims that because of his political affiliation and human rights activism, he was subjected to torturous experiences at the hands of the Respondent State which he survived. Thereafter, he fled to South Africa following threats to his life by the Respondent State. The Complainant argues that the fact that he did not collect his belongings is indicative of the urgency with which he left the country, emphasising that he did not leave the country voluntarily. 3