EX.CL/717 (XX) Page 156 Defense des Droits de l’Homme v Zambia53 the Commission stated that the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is founded on the principle that a government should have notice of human rights violation in order to have the opportunity to remedy such violations before being called before an international body. 66. Accordingly, the submissions of the parties in this case would be assessed in light of the above. 67. The Complainant submits that after the eviction order the petitioners appealed against the order in the High Court and then the Supreme Court, and both courts dismissed the appeal. They later appealed to the President of the Republic and received no response. The Complainant further submits that even though they have appealed to the President, they were not required to, as executive remedies are discretionary and non-judicial in nature. The Complainant accordingly submits that all local remedies have been exhausted. 68. The Respondent State in response argues that the Complainant has not exhausted local remedies as they have both administrative and judicial remedies left to pursue. According to the Respondent State, the petitioners could appeal to the President in terms of Section 8 of the Communal Land Act and could get administrative, not executive, remedy which can redress their claims. If they are not satisfied with the President’s decision, the Respondent State argues, they could always take their case before the High Court for review as per the Administrative Justice Act. The Respondent State further avers that the Supreme Court could have been as well approached for relief on the basis of Section 24(2) of the Constitution. The Respondent State is also of the view that the High Court and Supreme Court never made a final determination of the matter on the basis of the merits of the case. 69. In the present Communication after the eviction order from the Magistrate Court the petitioners’ took their case to the High Court contending that the decision of the Council should be reviewed.54 This was dismissed by Justice Ziyambi who did not find any conduct which was reviewable on the part of the Council. The petitioners appealed against the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court and the latter also dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court stated that the appeal was argued by the appellant (petitioners) on the wrong basis. The appeal was argued on the basis that the first respondent’s (the Council’s) decision of 19 August 1998 was made in terms of Section 32 of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (Chapter 29:12) which according to the Supreme Court had nothing to do with what transpired in this case. 53 Communication 71/92 – Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v Zambia (1997) para 10. 54 Mungofa Gotora v Nditra Muzerengwa and 32 Others (Zimbabwean Magistrate Court for the Province of Manicaland) Annexure C