147 4. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the application of the double jeopardy principle precludes the Prosecution from appealing against acquittals, except where the appeal challenges an acquittal tainted by bribery, threats or other interference with a witness or juror,3 or where the appeal is from acquittal in the magistrates’ court by case stated to the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division on the ground that it was rendered in error of law or in excess of jurisdiction. 5. Thus, it seems that the common law gives special weight to acquittals. In the United Kingdom, the Prosecution does not have the right to appeal although appeals are allowed in certain clearly circumscribed instances. In the United States, there is a complete bar on appeals against acquittals.4 6. I turn now to examine the position adopted by countries in the civil law tradition. Civil law generally allows appeals against decisions at first instance. However, decisions rendered by the second-tier courts can be appealed by way of cassation only on errors of law. In France, the Prosecution may lodge a pourvoi en cassation to challenge procedural irregularities, which inter alia, include an error in law made by the lower court.5 7. In Germany, Prosecution appeals against acquittals are not considered to violate non bis in idem because the judgement at trial is not seen to constitute the end of the criminal proceeding.6 It seems that, in the German legal system, jeopardy attaches with the criminal charge and continues through all proceedings that arise from the original charge.7 Hence, a Prosecution appeal from acquittal is seen as another step in the criminal proceedings. 8. This brief survey of domestic practice, though far from comprehensive, reveals that no general principle of law can be drawn from domestic practice. Unlike the AngloAmerican common law system, the civil law system does not construe Prosecution appeals against acquittals to compromise the principle of non bis in idem. 3 See s. 54 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. See supra, note 2. 5 See Dadomo, Christian and Farran, Susan, The French Legal System (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996), 220. 6 See ss. 312 and 333 of the German Criminal Code. 7 Justice Holmes, dissenting in Kepner v. United States, advocated the adoption of the concept of “continuing jeopardy”. He argued that “a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy on the same cause, however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause.” The majority, concluding that the verdict at trial terminated the initial jeopardy, rejected Justice Holmes’argument. 4