i. Objections to material jurisdiction 30. The Respondent State raises three objections to the Court’s material jurisdiction, namely: (a) the absence of a dispute; (b) the fact that the Applicant State invokes texts that are not human rights instruments; and (c) that the Applicant State invokes human rights instruments that Rwanda has not ratified. a. Objection to material jurisdiction based on the absence of a dispute 31. The Respondent State maintains that in inter-state matters, the Court’s jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of a dispute within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Protocol. According to the Respondent State, this provision is similar to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the “ICJ”). In support of this contention, it cites the ICJ ruling on preliminary objections in the matter of Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). 32. In support of its argument, the Respondent State points out that the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter referred to as “PCIJ”) and the ICJ declined jurisdiction respectively in the matter of Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria) and Obligations Relating to Negotiations Concerning Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India) involving issues of peace and security, on the grounds that there was no dispute between the parties at the time of filing the applications. 33. The Respondent State further contends that the existence of a dispute, at the time of filing the Application, allows, first, for verification that the question submitted to the Court is capable of giving rise to the exercise of its judicial function and, second, protecting the parties from unnecessary, precipitous or insufficiently substantiated litigation. 9