80. In support of his argument, the Applicant cites the Court’s decision in Diocles William v. Tanzania where it was held that although the applicant through his counsel had opted not to call witnesses, the latter did not cease to be necessary during trial. It is the Applicant’s contention that, in such instances, the Respondent State’s judicial authorities are required to be proactive in ascertaining whether the Applicant no longer intended to call his witnesses. According to the Applicant, the fact that the Respondent State failed to do so in the instant case amounts to a violation of the right to defence. 81. Without responding directly to the Applicant’s allegations, the Respondent State in its Response submits that the Applicant was afforded a fair hearing, and that the Application has no merit and must be dismissed. *** 82. In its caselaw, the Court has held that an essential aspect of the right to defence includes the right to call witnesses in one’s defence.32 Further, the Court has held that the right to defence as set out in Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter is a key component of the right to a fair trial and reflects the potential of a judicial process to offer the parties the opportunity to express their claims and submit their evidence.33 83. The question to be determined is whether obtaining the attendance of witnesses during the domestic proceedings was the sole responsibility of the accused or whether the judicial authorities of the Respondent State also had the duty to ensure the presence of defence witnesses. 32 Umuhoza v. Rwanda (merits), supra, § 93; Ivan v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), supra, § 73 and William v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 62. 33 Sébastien Germain Ajavon v. Republic of Benin (judgment) (4 December 2020) 4 AfCLR 133, § 141. 23