to the detention complained of — which detention is allegedly still ongoing. We should count the two months commencing from the day when the detention started. The Respondents, on the other hand, contended that the time limit should start to run when the detention ceases. In our considered view that contention would not fit with what the first limb of Article 30 (2) dictates — namely, that: “The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two months of the … action complained of”` 37. The “action” in the instant case was the detention. That detention was effected and started on the same date of the arrest and rendition of the Respondents. Accordingly, it is clear that the two months started to run from the day that the arrest/rendition/ and detention were effected; and the resultant cause of action before this Court is clearly time - barred. This is the proper interpretation to be given to the first limb of Article 30 (2), in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to its terms and in their context — as stipulated by Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention. We should emphasize that the cause of action for the Reference now before this Court is not the alleged unlawful detention of the Respondents in Uganda, nor indeed their arrest and rendition from Kenya to Uganda — which are a matter of criminal law. Rather, it is the alleged infringement of the EAC Treaty by the Partner States of Kenya and Uganda – which is a matter of civil law. 38. The Appellant contended that the two-month limit starts running from the date the Respondents became aware of their detention. But that contention is tantamount to jumping to the second limb of Article 30 (2) which, as we have indicated earlier, comes into play only where the first limb cannot apply. Indeed, in this Court’s view, the second limb is a defence for he who alleges that he did not know the date of the enactment, publication, directive, decision or action. He may come to Court years after the enactment, publication, directive, decision or action to prove to the Court that indeed he had no such knowledge. In that event, the Court would compute the two months from the date that person acquired such knowledge. 11