IV
10.
The European15 and Inter-American16 courts, for their part, also admit
that a document could constitute a “fact”, discovery of which is likely to provide
grounds for revision of their judgments.
11. If it stems from this brief jurisprudential overview that an “evidence” can
constitute a “fact”, the conclusion cannot however be made that a “fact”
necessarily forms part of an “evidence”. The concept of “fact” is indeed wider
than that of “evidence”. As has been rightly emphasised, “whether in the context
Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),
Preliminary objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia-Herzegovina), Judgment, ICJ
Report 2003,
p
7;
Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening)
(El Salvador v. Honduras), Judgment, ICJ Report 2003, p. 392.
14
Application
for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, pp 203-204, paragraphs 19-21, and p. 213,
paragraphs 38-39. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Paolillo appended to the
Judgment rendered on 18 December 2003 with regard to the Application for Revision of the
Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute, pp. 421-423, paragraphs 29-34.
15
See the three Judgments rendered by the European Court on revision. Case of Pardo v.
France (Revision), Application 13416/87, Judgment of 10 July 1996, p. 9, paragraphs 19, 20
and 24; the Court decided that as the documents (a letter and a document in the appeal file)
have a decisive influence, they could be regarded as “facts” within the meaning of its Rules,
and hence declared admissible the Application for Revision filed by the European
Commission; see also the Judgment of 28 January 2000 rendered in the Case of McGinley
and Egan v. United Kingdom (Revision), Applications 21825/93 and 23414/94, and which the
Court held that the letters could constitute “facts” (paragraph 31), but dismissed the
Application for Revision on the grounds that the said facts “could reasonably be known” to
the Applicants before the initial judgment was rendered (paragraph 36). See lastly the
Judgment of 30 July 1998 rendered in the Case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (Revision),
Application 15573/89; the Court did not however make a ruling on the notion of “fact” and
dismissed the Application on the sole ground that the new elements did not have decisive
influence on the initial judgment.
16
“The application for judicial review must be based on important facts or situations that
were unknown at the time the judgment was delivered. The judgment may therefore be
impugned for exceptional reasons, such as those involving documents the existence of which
was unknown at the time the judgment was delivered; documentary or testimonial evidence or
confessions in a judgment that have acquired the effect of a final judgment and is later found
to be false; when there has been prevarication, bribery, violence, or fraud, and facts
subsequently proven to be false, such as a person having been declared missing and found to
be alive”, Case of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua (Application for Judicial Review of the
Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs), Court Order of 13 September 1997, op. cit., p.
5, paragraph 12.