not been subjected to domestic remedies, and thus minimize the importance of such remedies in referrals to the Court. 19.In my view, this runs counter to the tenets of the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies and to the rights of States in this regard. i. As for the objection regarding reasonable time, application of this concept by the Court runs counter to the very essence of Article 56 of the Charter, Article 6(2) of the Protocol and Rules 39 and 40 of the Rules 20. It is apparent from the Judgment under reference in this Separate Opinion’ that although the Court declared the local remedies as having been exhausted on 14/4/2011, and thus that as at the date of filing of the Application, that is 6/7/2015, four (4) years, two (2) months and twenty-three (23) days had elapsed, the Court, in its deliberation and decision on the filing of the Application within reasonable time, held in conclusion that this period remains reasonable due to the fact that the Application was filed on 6/7/2015, three (3) months after the Applicants’ application for review was dismissed by judgment of 20/03/2015.8 21.The Court pointed out, moreover, that the Applicants are lay incarcerated persons, and did not have the benefit of assistance by counsel, while noting the fact that they had filed for a review - an extraordinary remedy - and that they were not to blame for having awaited a decision in this regard. 22. Whereas it is apparent from Article 56 of the Charter and Rule 40 of the Rules in their respective paragraph 5 that the Application must be filed after the exhaustion of local remedies, paragraphs 6 of these same Articles confer on the Court the prerogative to determine whether the time limit for filing the Application is reasonable after the local remedies have been exhausted or the date that it would have set as being the commencement of the time limit for its own referral. 23.In the present occurred case, after the the Court, ordinary having remedies taken were into account exhausted, the facts which namely, the review application, to justify the period of four (4) years, two (2) months and three (3) days, could simply have retained the date of the judgment rendered after the 7 Paragraph 36 of the Judgment ® Paragraph 49 of the Judgment