LINGENS v. AUSTRIA JUGDMENT 7 the expressions "the basest opportunism", "immoral" and "undignified". However, it held that certain other expressions were not defamatory in their context ("minimum requirement of political ethics", "monstrosity"). It fined him 20,000 Schillings, considering as mitigating circumstances the fact that the accused intended to voice political criticism of politicians on political questions and that the latter were expected to show greater tolerance of defamation than other individuals. In view of the defendant’s good faith it awarded Mr. Kreisky no damages but, on his application, ordered the confiscation of the articles complained of and the publication of the judgment. 22. In its decision, which contained a lengthy statement of reasons, the Regional Court first examined the objectively defamatory character of each of the passages complained of. It held that the expressions "basest opportunism", "immoral" and "undignified" were defamatory and were directly or indirectly aimed at Mr. Kreisky personally, whereas the words "minimum requirement of political ethics" and "monstrosity" did not go beyond the accepted limits of political criticism. According to Mr. Lingens, the first three expressions were valuejudgments and therefore as such not contrary to Article 111 of the Criminal Code. However, the Regional Court considered that the unfavourable conclusions drawn with regard to the then Chancellor’s behaviour fell within the scope of that provision. Nor could the defendant rely on his right to freedom of expression, since the relevant provisions of the Constitution and Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention authorised limitations of this right: a balance had to be struck between this right and the right to respect for private life and reputation. In the instant case the applicant had gone beyond the permissible limits. 23. As regards Mr. Kreisky’s use of a private prosecution, the Regional Court pointed out that he had been criticised not in his capacity as Federal Chancellor but as a leading member of his party and a politician. Article 117 para. 2 of the Criminal Code therefore did not apply in the instant case : it made defamation of an office-holder punishable, but solely by means of a public prosecution commenced with the consent of the person concerned, who could not bring a private prosecution unless the prosecuting authorities refused to act. 24. The Regional Court then considered the question of proving truth (preuve de la vérité) (see paragraph 20 above). It held that as the applicant had not provided evidence to justify the expression "basest opportunism", that was sufficient to lead to his conviction. With regard to the words "immoral" and "undignified", the accused had used them in relation to Mr. Kreisky’s attitude consisting in minimising Nazi atrocities, referring to Mr. Wiesenthal’s activities as being of a mafiatype and insinuating that the latter had collaborated with the Gestapo. On this last point the Regional Court admitted evidence produced by Mr.