6 PANYIK v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT of objective impartiality provides a further important guarantee (see Pullar v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III). In other words, the Court has recognised the difficulty of establishing a breach of Article 6 on account of subjective partiality and for this reason has in the vast majority of cases raising impartiality issues focused on the objective test. However, there is no watertight division between the two notions since the conduct of a judge may not only prompt objectively held misgivings as to impartiality from the point of view of the external observer (objective test) but may also go to the issue of his or her personal conviction (subjective test). 28. As to the second test, when applied to a body sitting as a bench, it means determining whether, quite apart from the personal conduct of any of the members of that body, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to its impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of some importance (see Castillo Algar v. Spain, 28 October 1998, § 45, Reports 1998-VIII; and Morel v. France, no. 34130/96, § 42, ECHR 2000-VI). When it is being decided whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular body lacks impartiality, the standpoint of those claiming that it is not impartial is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether the fear can be held to be objectively justified (see Ferrantelli and Santangelo v. Italy, 7 August 1996, § 58, Reports 1996-III; and Wettstein v. Switzerland, no. 33958/96, § 44, ECHR 2000-XII). b. Application of the above principles to the present case 29. Turning to the particular case, the Court observes that the applicant complains about the alleged impartiality of the Regional Court, as the panel judge deciding his action on appeal had, in a previous case of his, declared himself biased, and two out of three judges deciding about his motion for impartiality against this judge had earlier withdrawn themselves from the case on account of their personal prejudice. The Court’s task is therefore to assess whether the particular circumstances of the case raise objectively justified doubts as to the neutrality of the Regional Court. 30. Concerning the Government’s argument that the applicant did not adduce any evidence to substantiate bias of the panel judge Dr V., the Court observes that indeed his personal prejudice had not been proven, as, apart from his earlier declaration of being biased in another case, there had been no particular signs or acts showing prejudice on his side. The Court therefore acknowledges that the personal impartiality of Dr V. should be presumed. However, this corresponds only to the subjective test established by the Court. 31. It remains to be ascertained whether the appearance of impartiality was observed under the objective test. The Court draws attention to the fact that the reason for which Dr V. withdrew voluntarily from a previous case