16 by the Convention in this regard. These limitations must be in accordance with strict proportionality criteria. 57. Given the importance of freedom of thought and expression in a democratic society and the great responsibility it entails for professionals in the field of social communications, the State must not only minimize restrictions on the dissemination of information, but also extend equity rules, to the greatest possible extent, to the participation in the public debate of different types of information, fostering informative pluralism. Consequently, equity must regulate the flow of information. Under these terms is to be explained the protection of the human rights of those who face the power of the media and the attempt to ensure the structural conditions which allow the equitable expression of ideas.51 58. Taking the foregoing into consideration, in order to render judgment in the instant case the Court will i) verify whether the legal definition of the crime of defamation affected the strict legality which is to be observed when restricting the freedom of thought and expression by means of criminal proceedings; ii) examine whether the protection of the reputation of judges serves a legitimate purpose, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and determine, if appropriate, the suitability of a criminal penalty in order to achieve the purpose sought; iii) assess whether such measure is necessary, and iv) examine the strict proportionality of such measure, that is, whether the penalty imposed on Mr. Kimel has fully guaranteed the right of the public official mentioned by the author of the book to have his honor respected, without rendering nugatory the latter’s right to express his opinion. i) Strict formulation of the rule establishing limitations or restrictions (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia criminal principle) 59. The Commission alleged that, “crimes against the honor were clearly used to limit the criticism of the actions of public officials.” In this regard, it held that “the definition of the conduct of [defamation] is affected by […] such ambiguity, broadness, and openness that it allows […] conducts which were previously considered as contempt to be unduly punished under this criminal definition.” Furthermore, the Commission argued that “the mere existence [of the criminal definitions applied to Mr. Kimel], given the threat of being subject to criminal and pecuniary sanctions, acts as a deterrent to criticism of the actions of public officials.” In this regard, it stated that “[s]hould the State decide to keep in force the legislation punishing defamation, it must describe it with such accuracy that it does not impair the right to express critical opinions regarding the actions of public bodies and officials.” 60. The representatives pointed out that the criminal definition of the false imputation of a publicly actionable crime “refers to a completely indeterminate conduct,” inasmuch as the “terms ‘dishonor’ and ‘discredit’ another person, do not describe a particular conduct.” Therefore, they considered that “there is no objective pattern against which a person may measure and predict the possible illegality of his expressions. Rather, they refer to a subjective value judgment reached by a judge.” They added that “the both criminal definitions are extremely vagu[e]” as Mr. Kimel “was convicted for defamation in the first instance, and [for] false imputation of a publicly actionable crime later.” 61. This Court has jurisdiction –based upon the American Convention and grounded in the iura novit curia principle, which is solidly supported in international case law- to examine the possible violation of conventional provisions which have not been alleged in the 51 The Court has pointed out that “the plurality of the media and the prohibition of all types of monopolies in relation thereto, whatever be the form they may adopt, is imperative […].” Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, supra note 44, para. 34.